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1. INTRODUCTION 
Both the People's Republic of China (the “PRC" or “China勺組d
the Socialist Republic of Vietnam (“Vie加am")are making the transition 
企oma centrally planned economy to a market-based economy. An 
effective bankruptcy law is an integral part ofthe institutional合amework
necessary for this仕組sition. China enacted the Law of the People's 
Republic of China on Enterprise Bankruptcy (Trial Implementation) on 
December 2， 1986， and it came into operation on October 1， 1988 (the 
“吋1986Chinese Bankruptcy Lawザ"勺写").1ν). 百1凶i凶slaw is applicable to State-Owned 
Enterprises (“SOEs" 
was appro刀ved，2with Chapter XIX applying to the bankruptcy of non-SOE 
ent旬e中，riseswith legal person status.3 The drafting of a bankruptcy law in 
Vietnam followed企omArticle 15 of the 1992 Constitution of the 
Socialist Republic of Vietnam， which institutionalized the policy to 
“promote the development of the multi-sector market-oriented economy 
with...State management towards socialism.，4 The new bankruptcy law 
1 中隼人民共和国企\j~破戸法(試行) [Laws of the People' s Repubhc of China on Enterprise 
Bankruptcy (Trial Implementation)) (Dec. 2， 1986) [hereinafter the 1986 Chinese Bankruptcy Law]， 
translated in Legis1ative Affairs Commission of the Standing Commission of the National Pe泊ple's
Congress (compilation)， LAWS OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CH別A(CIVIL A~D C印刷ERCIAL
LAWS 289-297) (1983-1986)目
2 中隼人民共和国民事訴訟法[pRCCivil Procedure Law] (promulgated by Order No. 44 of the 
President of血ePRC on Apr. 9， 1991釦 defTective as of that date). 
3 Another bankruptcy provision included皿 nationallegislation is肌 189in Chapter VIII of the中
王将人民共和国公司法 [PRCCompany Law of 1993) (adopted on Dec. 29， 1993血 drevised on 
Dec. 25， 1999 and Aug. 28， 2004) [hereinafter the PRC Company Law] (for companies formed 
under Chinese law). AIso applicable 10恥 bankruptcyof both SOE祖 dnon-SOE 1egal person 
enterprises are various judicial interpretations， rules，皿dadminis回 tivedeα'ees， such as血c最高人
民法院(美子市理企~破芹案件若干内題的規定) [Provisions of the Supreme People' s Court 
on Issues Conceming血eTrial ofEnterprise Bankruptcy Cases) (promulgated on July 30， 2002 and 
effective on September 1， 2002) [hereinafter出e2002 PRC Supreme People's Co町 tProvisions]. 
Local insolvency procedures have also developed in m加 yp釘包 ofChina， e.g.， in Shenzhen: see 
Xianchu Zhang & Charles D. Booth， Chinese Bankruptcy Law in an Emerging Market Economy: 
The Shenzhen Experience， 15 COLUM. 1. ASIAN L. 1 (2001) [hereinafter Zhang & Boo白，Chinese 
Bankruptcy Law初 anEmerging Market Economy]. 
4 See RESEARCH TEAM (Chaired by Dr. Du日ngDang Hue)， R正5巨A1{CHRJ;PORT， ASSESSMENT， 
ANAL YSlS， RESEARCH OF CVRRENT STA TVS TO RECOMMEND ON COMPLETION OF BANKRUPTCY 
LAW AND RELATED LEGAL PROVISIONS， Vietnarnese Minis町 ofJustice， at lntroduction 
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was one of the laws that the Vietnamese began drafting later that year 
with the goal of creating a “uniform， complete legal system." 5 The 
drafting process moved quickly， and the VieむlameseLaw on Enterprise 
Bankruptcy (血e“1993Vietnamese Bankruptcy Law") was enacted on 
December 30， 1993， and took effect on July 1， 1994.6 This law rejected 
the bifurcated Chinese approach of separate laws for SOEs and non-SOE 
legal person enterprises in favor of a single law白atapplied to both SOEs 
and non-SOE ente甲山es.'It was also more expansive than the Chinese 
approach in that it applied to both legal person and non-legal person 
enterprises.8 
These laws did not live up to early expectations. By 1994， the 
Chinese government had already decided to begin dra食inga new national 
bankruptcy law. From 1989 until 1994， the courts had accepted few 
bankruptcy cases: 98 in 1989， 32 in 1990， 117 in 1991，428 in 1992， and 
478 in 1993.9 In Vietnam，企omJuly 1994 to September 2001， the number 
of cases was even lower: the number of bankruptcy applications per year 
never exceeded 30， and only 58 enterprises were 叫judicatedbankrupt by 
the courts.lυ Of these bankruptcies in China and Vietnam， the number of 
cases that led to successful reorganizations was very low.ll 
(Vietnamese Minis町 ofJ凶討∞ 2002)[hereinafter VIETNAMESE BANKRUPTCY LAW RESEARCH 
R即 ORT].
5Id. 
6 Vie回 meseLaw on Enterprise Bankruptcy (Dec. 30， 1993) [h崎四inafter也e1993 Vietnamese 
Ba歯 uptcyL側]，available at 
htto:/Iwww.vietn副nese-1aw-consul匂恥v.com/sources/sbankcruntcvlbankcruntcv 05 98.htIn. ln 
Vie組閣n，the bankruptcy law has also been supplemented by various judicial interpretations釦 d
a也凶ms仕組ve白川:rees.See also VIETNAMESE BANKRUPTCY LAW RESEARCH REPORT， supra note 
予， atPart on鳥 III(“Actua1status of enterprise b叩 kruptcy1附 inVietnam"). 
， This foJ1owed on from the po1icy that aJ1 ent疋rprisesshould be treated equaJ1y. VIETNAMESE 
BANKRUPTCY LAW RESEARCH REpORT， supra note 4， atIntroduction目
o Id. at Part Three， I， 1 (“On applicable scale of恥 BankruptcyLaw'ヲ.
ヲ Accordingto由eStatistics of位lePRC Sup陀 mePeop1e's Court in March 2001， cited in WANG 
WEIGUO & CHARLES D. BOOTH， STUDY ON ALTERNATNE APPROACHES FOR DEBT 
REsTRUCπ瓜閃GOFE悶 ERP悶 SESIN CHINA 12 (Wor1d Bank Report for仕leSta句 Economy3Ild 
Trade Commission of China， 2002). The statistics of也ePRC Supreme People's Court are not 
阻 fom吐yaccepted. According白 血 statisticsof the北京!恩源兼井与破戸空手淘事安全所 [Beijing
Si抑制 Merger3Ild Bankruptcy Cons叫ぬncy]，邸民porぬdby曹恩源 [CaoSi戸l3Il] in the 
Implementation and Revision 01 the Banknψtcy System in China， a paper presented at INSOL China 
2002， held in Beijing， China， (Oct. 9・1，2002) [hereinafter Statistics of the Beijing Sijyu3Il Merger 
組dBa且畑中tcyConsu1t3Ilcy]，出erewere 710 cases in 1993. 
出 Statisticsof山 ViemameseSupreme People's Court， cited in VIETNAMESE BANKRUPTCY LAW 
RESEARCH REPORT， supra note 4， atP制 Two，1， 1.1 (“Practice of Accept3Ilce 3Ild Settlement of 
Application for Declaration of B組 kruptcy勺組d1n岡山ιtion.Ho岬 cever，the REpORT no陥加t血e
statistical data provided by the VietIlamese Supreme People's Court was “incomplete." Id Most of 
the cases were from白elarger provinces 3Ild cities (suchぉ HoChi Minh Ci勺"H3Iloi， 3Ild Hai 
Phong); some provinces reported no bankrupωies at all. Id. at Part Two， 1， 2ユ
1 Regarding China， s百王主国，破芹法 [WANGWEIGUQ， BANKRUPTCY LA w] 220 (in Chinese， 
1999) (由enumber of cases invoking the reorganization provisions in the law was c10se to zero); 
悶 gardingVi暗むlam，see VIETNAMESE BANKRUPTCY LAW RESEARCH REpORT， supra note 4， atPart 
Two， H， 1.1.1. 
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For many years， both China and Vietnam have focused on how 
best to improve these older laws and enact more modem insolvency 
regimes. The Chinese government initiated a review of the Chinese 
bankruptcy law in 1994， and a first draft was completed in 1995. After a 
hiatus that was caused in part by a concem about the high level of 
unemployment likely to be caused by allowing many SOEs to go into 
bankruptcy， 12 the dra剖ngprocess resumed in 1998. Further drafts of the 
law were released for comment， inc1uding drafts in 2000，2001，2002，組d
more recently， in June 2004 (respectively the “200OJ'“2001，"“2002，"or 
“June 2004 Draft Chinese Bankruptcy Law"). Roughly two-thirds of the 
2002 draft was incorporated into the June 2004 draft. The June 2004 
dra抗wassubmitted to the Standing Committee of the National People's 
Congress on June 21， 2004; since then an even more recent draft has 
emerged (the “October 2004 Dra食ChineseBankruptcy Law"). In effect， 
the current version is a work in process. There remains a general hope 
that a draft wil1 be fmalized by the middle of 2005 and come into 
operation in 2006， but this is dependent on agreement being reached on 
several issues that have proved to be in仕actableand which are discussed 
below. 
By June 2002， Vietnam had completed a draft bankruptcy law 
(the “2002 Draft Vietnamese Bankruptcy Lawワ.When comparing the 
2002 Vietnamese and Chinese drafts shortly after they were issued， it 
appeared that the Vie租amesereform process was at組 earlierstage; but 
much progress was made in Vietnam over the next two years and a new 
Vieむlamesebankruptcy law， the Vie位lameseLaw on Bankruptcy， was 
enacted on June 15， 2004 and came into operation on October 15， 2004 
(the “2004 Vietnamese Bankruptcy Law").13百lefact that Vietnam 
enacted its new bankruptcy law before China did is significant because 
during the dra食ingprocess the Vietnamese were interested in how the 
Chinese govemment was dealing with similar issues of insolvency law 
reform and the movement towards a market-oriented economy in the 
Chinese draft law.14 However， the Vie加amesewere able to reach a 
consensus more quickly than the Chinese have. 
An earlier artic1e 1 co・authoredcompared the 2002 draft Chinese 
組 dVietnamese laws and highlighted seven areas of the proposals.15 The 
present artic1e provides an update on the insolvency reform processes in 
12 Charles D. Boo血，Chinese lnsolvency Law: Developing an lnsolvency 付加何仰re，IPBA J.13， 
13 (Mar. 201) (noting comments of朱少平 [ZhuShao Ping]， Chair of白eWorking Group for 
Dra他 g勘 NewChinese Bankruptcy Law， Fiscal and Economic committee under山 Standingof 
the PRC National People's Congres) 
13 Vietnarnese Law on Bankruptcy， Law No. 2l/2004/QH11 [hereinafter也e2004 Vie個出nese
l3ankruptcy Law] 
，. 1 learned this first-hand when 1 conducted four days of workshops organized by the Vietnarnese 
Minis甘Yof Justice， including two days with the Vietnarnese bankruptcy law dra拍 19cornmite， on
也e202 Dra食VietnarneseBankruptcy Law， in Hanoi， Vietnarn， in June 202. 
1) See Booth & Chiu in the note referenced 10 the titIe of白is紅白Ie.
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China and Vietnam since mid・2002.Part 1 sets out the overall insolvency 
合ameworkin China and Vietnam， and Parts I to VI consider five of the 
areas discussed in the earlier piece -namely， the scope of the bankruptcy 
laws; bankruptcy adminis佐ation;co中oraterehabilitation; priorities in 
dis佐ibutionand the protection of employees' interests; and cross-border 
insolvency.16 This article identifies weaknesses in the current bankruptcy 
law regime in China and in the former regime in Vie加amthat the law 
reform processes in both coun佐ieshave addressed. It notes where the 
October 2004 Draft Chinese Bankruptcy Law differs from the 2002 
Chinese draft and highlights the areas that stil need to be fmalized. It 
also identifies those areas in which the new 2004 Vietnamese Bankruptcy 
Law differs企omthe 2002 Vietnamese dra食 andsuggests where further 
improvements could be made. Throughout the article， 1 will be drawing 
comparisons between the Vietnamese and Chinese approaches. 
I. INSOL VENCY FRAMEWORK 
Legal reforms in and of themselves are not sufficient to solve 
insolvency problems. This is even truer in countries such as China and 
Vietnam with economies in仕ansitionand systemic insolvency in some 
state-owned sectors. For example， when trying to address the problems 
with SOEs and state-owned banks， govemment officials must decide (1) 
whether to enact laws such as formal court-centered liquidation and 
corporate rescue laws to allow the market to sort out the problems; or (2) 
to implement administrative reforms， such as the creation of Asset 
Management Companies (“AMCs") to fulfil cen回 1or local govemment 
policy directives， or a combination of the two. Viewing the bankruptcy 
laws in China and Vie加amas but one part， albeit a very important part， of 
this overall framework proves helpful in deciding what the proper scope 
ofthese laws should be. 
China 
China's current insolvency 企amework is a patchwork of 
over1apping structures including the following:17 
(1) National bankruptcy laws and other legal provisions and 
procedures. The two national bankruptcy laws are the 1986 Chinese 
Bankruptcy Law for SOESl8 and Chapter XIX ofthe PRC Civil Procedure 
Law entitled Procedure for Bankruptcy and Debt Pa戸nentof Legal 
Person Enterprises for non-SOE enterprises with legal person statuS.19 
Article 206 of the PRC Civil Procedure Law exc1udes企omthe coverage 
of Chapter XIX“non-legal person enterprises， individual businesses， 
16Id. 
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lease-holding farm households and partnerships formed by private 
individuals.'却
China also has solvent liquidation procedures in Chapter VIII of 
the PRC Company Law entitled Bankruptcy， Dissolution and Liquidation 
of Companies for companies (limited liability companies and companies 
limited by shares) formed under the PRC Company La~l and in the PRC 
Liquidation Procedures of For悶ei伊 In町1ve回s出加1e釘叩削n凶1tEnt旬er中pr戸ises ( “ PRC 
Liq中uida創副t“10∞nProcedures of FIEs"γ 2 Both the PRC Company Law and the 
PRC Liquidation P計ro∞ce吋d町 e白s0ぱfFIEs include provisions for commencing 
a bankruptcy case where in the course of the liquidation of the enterprise 
it becomes apparent that the assets are insufficient to cover the debts: 
Article 196 of the PRC Company Law and Article 27 of the PRC 
Liquidation Procedures of FIEs each require the liquidation committee to 
apply to the People's Court for a declaration of the bankruptcy of the 
enterprise. Article 196 provides that after the People's Court has ruled to 
declare the company bankrupt， the liquidation committee shall turn the 
liquidation matters over to the court. Article 27， in a similar vein， 
provides that if the enterprise is declared bankrupt in accordance with the 
law， matters shal1 be handled in accordance with the laws and 
adminis佐ativeregulations conceming bankrupt liquidation. In other 
words， Articles 196 and 27 take insolvent liquidations out of the company 
law and FIE procedures and “feed" them into the bankruptcy provisions 
under the PRC Civil Procedure Law. For FIEs， once the bankruptcy 
declaration is made， the PRC Liquidation Procedures for FIEs are no 
longer applicable. However， that is not the result for companies under the 
PRC Company Law， because Article 189 of the PRC Company Law 
provides: 
Where a company is declared bar歯 uptaccording to law 
because it is unable to pay off its due debts， a People's 
Court shal1， in accordance with relevant laws， organize the 
17 For further discussion of出 spatchwork， see Rona1d Winston Harmer， Insolvency Law and 
Refonn in the People 's Republic of China. 64 FORDHAM 1. REv. 2563 (1996); Gordon C. Chang， 
B仰 kruptcyLaw in China: too much orωo litle? 13(5) CHINA 1. & PRAC. 22 (June/July 1999); 
GUANGHUA Yu & MlNKANG GU， Enterprise Bankruptcy Law (Chapter 15) in LAWS AFFECTING 
BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS IN THE PRC (2001); Li Shugl刷 g，1百eSignificance Brought by the 
Drafting of the New Bankruptcy Law to China 祉 CreditCu/ture and Credit Insti・似印刷， paper 
presented at the Forum on Asian Insolvency Refonn 2004: Insolvency Systems and Risk 
Management in Asia， held in New Delhi， India， Nov. 3-5， 2004， sponsored by the World Bank，仕le
Asian Development Bank， and the OECD. 
18 See 1986 Chinese Bankruptcy Law 
"See PRC Civil Procedure Law (1991). 
;:hEaho2002PResupmepeopldCOMPmmns，M4  
PRC Company Law of 1993， Chapter VIII (adopted on Dec. 29， 1993 and revised on Dec. 25， 
1999 and Aug. 28，2004) [hぽeina貧er血ePRC Company Law]. 
22 外商投資企.ill:清算管理か法 [LiquidationProced町岱 ofForei伊InvestmentEnterprises 
adopted by the Ministry of Foreign Trade and Economic Cooperation] (Ju1y 9， 1996) [hereinafter 
白ePRC Liquidation Procedures ofFIEs]. 
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shareholders， the relevant departments and relevant 
professional to forrn a liquidation committee which shall 
conduct the bankruptcy liquidation of the company. 
99 
百lIsprovision is applicable after the declaration of bankruptcy has been 
made. It applies in bankruptcies commenced by company liquidation 
committees under Article 196 of the PRC Company Law and in 
bankruptcies commenced by debtors or creditors under Article 199 of the 
PRC Civil Procedure Law. Thus， Article 189 of the PRC Company Law 
supplements the provisions of the PRC Civil Procedure Law in 
bankruptcies involving PRC companies. 
Also relevant in the legal合ameworkis Article 71 of the PRC 
Commercial Bank Law，23 which provides that if a commercial bank is 
unable to pay its debts as they fal due， a People' s Court shall， after 
obtaining consent of the China Banking Regulatory Commission， declare 
it bankrupt. A similar provision is included in the PRC Insurance Law for 
insurance companies， which requires approval仕omthe China Insurance 
Regulatory Commission instead戸
With so many applicable laws， it might at frst glance appear that 
the law is comprehensive. In fact， the reality is just the opposite because 
these laws are so short and incomplete -comprising merely the 43 articles 
in 1986 Chinese Bankruptcy Law， the eight articles in Chapter XIX ofthe 
PRC Civil Procedure Law， and a handful of other provisions (as noted 
above). Moreover， asone commentator has noted， the changing nature of 
the ownership interests of SOEs (e.g. through government distribution of 
ownership interests and the selling small stakes of SOEs) has even made 
it difficu1t at times to deterrnine the proper scope of demarcation between 
the 1986 Chinese Bankruptcy Law and the PRC Civil Procedure Law.25 
(2) Judicial interpretations. With so few provisions related to 
insolvency in the existing legislation， it should not be surprising that there 
are many inconsistencies as well as gaps and omissions. The PRC 
Supreme People's Court has attempted to address these problems by 
issuing judicial interpretations. The PRC Supreme People's Court issued 
its Opinion on Questions Concerning the PRC Enterprise Insolvency Law 
(Trial Implementation) on November 7， 1991 (the 1991“PRC Supreme 
People's Court Opinion，).26 This opinion interprets the 1986 Chinese 
23 中隼人民共和国荷ir銀行法 [PRCCommercial Bank Law] (Promulgated by the President of 
血ePRC on May ¥0， 1995，加de汀ectiveas of J叫Y1， 1995) 
24 中隼人民共和国保陰法 [PRCInsurance Law] (Promulgated by the President of the PRC on 
June 30， 1995，釦deffective as of October 1， 1995)‘ 
μChang， supra note 17， at22-23. 
26最高人民法院美子貫初執行(中隼人民共和国企並破戸法(武行))若干向題的意見 [Ref
No. 2500/91.0.07]. Printed in the Research Office of出eSupreme People's Court (compilation)，中
隼人民共和国最高人民法院司法解粋全集(活頁)[THE ASSEMBLAGE OF JUDICIAL 
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Bankruptcy Law and with 76 artic1es is almost twice as long as the law 
itself. In 1992， itpromulgated the Application of the PRC Civi1 
Litigation Law Several Issues Opinion for non-SOE enterprise legal 
persons (with 14 artic1es).27 Most recent1y， on July 30， 2002， the Supreme 
People's Court promulgated its most comprehensive insolvency 
interpretation to date with “106 Artic1es: Several Issues Conceming the 
Trial of Enterprise Bankruptcy Cases" (the “2002 PRC Supreme People's 
Court Provisionsつ.28This interpretation applies to both the 1986 Chinese 
Bankruptcy Law and the PRC Civi1 Procedure Law and supercedes the 
court's earlier interpretations where they are inconsistent. The 2002 PRC 
Supreme People's Court Provisions “appear to be an attempt by the 
Supreme People's Court to promulgate one set of regulations that will 
govem both SOE and non-SOE bankruptcies" and “should go some way 
towards obviating speculation as to whether certain provisions of the 
[1986 Chinese Bankruptcy Law] have been applicable in non-SOE 
bankruptcies.円 29
(3) Important policy decrees issued by the government for certain 
SOEs. These decrees may form the most important structure in China for 
setting insolvency policy. The series of decrees are intended to facilitate 
debt restructuring on a large scale through merger and acquisition and 
bankruptcy under the Capital Structure Optimization Program 
(“CSOP'γ。OnOctober 25， 1994， the State Counci1 issued the notice 
entit1ed Proposal for Implementing State-Owned Enterprise Bankruptcy 
Law in Some Cities (the“1994 PRC Notice")，31 which addressed 
problems involving the resettlement of workers of state-owned indus佐ial
enterprises (“SIEs") made bankrupt in eighteen pilot cities， inc1uding 
Shanghai. This notice provided special釘eatmentfor the resettlement of 
workers -the land use rights obtained by a SIE were to be sold by auction 
or tender with the first priority to the proceeds to be used for the 
resettlement of the employees. The 1994 PRC Notice was followed by 
the Notice on Certain Issues on Trial Implementation of Mergers and 
Insolvency on State-Owned Ente中rises，which was issued by the former 
State Economy and Trade Commission (“SETCウandthe People's Bank 
of China on July 25， 1996戸Thisincreased the number of trial cities to 
INTERPRET A TIONS OF THE S凹阻MEPEOPLE'S COURT OF T田 PRC][hereinafter the 191 PRC 
Sup回目lePeop1e's Court Opinion]. 
27最高人民法院美子這用《中隼人民共和国民事訴訟法》若干問題的意見 [APPLlCATIONOF 
THE PRC CIVlL LITIGATION LAW SEVERAL ISSUES OPINION] (Nov. 7， 191) available at 
http:llwww.1awbook.com.cn!law/law view.aso?id=8106 
28 See却02PRC Supreme People' s Court Pro吋slOns.
。ChuaEu Jin， The Rφrm of the PRC Corporate Bankruptcy Law: S，ゐゆbutぬrely，16(8) C皿NA
L. &PRAC. 19，19 (Oct. 202). 
30 See W ANG & BoO四 ，supra note 9， at 8・16川知g).
31 国努院失子在若干城市試行国有企~破F有美阿題的通知(国友) [Docurnent No. 59] 
[hereinafter the 1994 PRC Notice]. 
32国家径涜貿易委員会、中国人民銀行美子i式行固有企.ill(兼井破戸中若干師題的通知
[Docurne凶 No.492]， 196. 
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56戸OnMarch 2， 1997， the State Council issued a further Supplementary 
Notice concerning the Problems Pertaining to the Trial Implementation of 
State-Owned Enterprise Merger & Bankruptcy and Re・employmentin 
Certain Cities (the“1997 PRC Notice")， which increased the number of 
出alcities to 111?4 Section 2 of the 1997 PRC Notice provided for the 
formulation of a Mergers and Bankruptcies of Enterprises Program to be 
established under the coordination of the former SETC， whereby in 
various trial cities， a list of enterprises would be drawn up for merger， 
bankruptcy， and rescue. The largest creditors of the SOEs一也eState・
owned banks -were to play an active role in the process and help identifシ
bad debts to be cancelled. 
These policy documents currently apply to al the cities in 
China. 35 They apply to SOEs whether or not the 1986 Chinese 
Bankruptcy Law applies， and the “special treatment" for workers 
resettlement rights would have priority over secured creditors and thus be 
inconsistent with the proced町田 fordis制butingassets in the 1986 law戸
These policy documents are crucial to understanding China's current 
approach to bankruptcy and SOEs， and are an integral part of China's 
“insolvency by policy" approach.37 They are certainly responsible for p訂 t
of the dramatic increase in the number of insolvency cases in China over 
the last decade.~o However， it is interesting to note that with the increase 
in the number of pilot cities from 18 to 56 in mid-1996 and then to 117 in 
early 1997， although the number of SOE bankruptcies increased企om
1，232 in 1995 to 3，651 in 1996， they then decreased to 3，060加 1997and 
remained roughly at that level through 2000 (3，056 in 1998; 2，886 in 
1999; and 3，296 in 200039). This leveling off， in fact， may be attributed in 
pa目 tothe government policy of “controlled‘planned bar水ruptcy;'"
according to the statistics of the former SETC，合om1996 to 2000 les 
than 30 per cent of SOE bankruptcies were bankrupted in accordance 
with initiatives ofthe CSOp.40 
(4) Additional administrative out-of-court restructuring そ併rts.
Of the variety of government-led restructuring efforts， several others 
3幻3Id. 
H国安条を院美子在若干滅市i武式行国有企2虫l位t兼弁破戸和駅工再就2虫l也k有夫向題的争朴ト充通知(園2友主)
{PD0ωc凹 e削n凶tN尚o.1川0何]， 1ω97 [肘herein
5 Li， supra note 17， al 3. 
36 See Chang， supra nole 17， at 23. 
17 Li， supra note 17， al 3-4. 
38 According 10出eStatistics ofthe PRC Supreme People's Court in March 201， there were 1，625 
cases in 194; 2，583 in 195; 5，875 in 196; 5，396 in 197; 5，673 in 198; 5，62 in 199; and 7，219 
in 200: WANG & BOOTH， supra note 9， at 12 (Wa且g).The Statistics of也eBeijing Siyuan Merger 
and Bankruptcy ConsuJtancy， supra note 9， for白紙 sameperiod are 1，625 cases in 194; 2，34 in 
195; 6，23 in 196; 4，515 in 197; 6，148担 198;4，591 in 199; and 7，528 in 200. It also reports 
t~at there were 8，939 cases in 201. See supra note 9 forthe statistics for 1989 10 193. 
>Y According to the Statistics ofthe PRC Supreme People's Court in March 201， cited in WANG & 
1300TH， supra note 9， at 12 (W組 g).
刊 WANG& BOOTH， supra note 9， at 12 (Wang)・
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deserve mention. In September 1999 at the 4由 Sessionof the 15th P町ty
Congress， the Decision on Several Significant Issues on the Refonn and 
Development of State-Owned Ente中riseswas made， which included 
measures for the bank:s to increase their bad-debt write-off of funds to 
support the merger and bank:ruptcy of the large and medium-sized 
SOES.41 Other measures included converting the debt of SOEs into 
equity， thereby converting the major creditors of the SOEs (the state-
owned commercial bank:s) into shareholders.42 Also in 1999， four AMCs 
were established to deal with the high level of non-perfonning loans 
(“NPLs") of the four main state-owned comrnercial bank:s，43 (estimated at 
about US$125 billion44) and others have been established since then戸A
further e首ortto improve the situation of SOEs and the state-owned bank:s 
was the restructuring procedure devised by the former SETC， which has 
come to be known as也e“ChangchunApproach.'>'!6 
(5) Loca/ ru/es and regu/ations. Many local governrnents， 
including provinces and prefec旬resand some cities， have enacted their 
own local regulations， procedures and rules to meet their local needs. An 
example can be found in the Shenzhen Special Economic Zone (the 
"Shenzhen SEZ Enterprise Bank:ruptcy Regulations，" enacted by the 
Standing Committee of the Shenzhen People's Congress on November 
10， 1993)ブ7
These five structures血 Chinacombine to form a complicated 
企ameworkfor bankruptcy: there are national efforts and local initiatives， 
governrnent central-planning policies and more market-oriented 
initiatives， and different national bank:ruptcy laws for different types of 
debtors. 
41Id. at 1 (Wang). 
位 Yu& Gu， supra no旬 17，at550・551
拍 ChinaXinda Asset Management Company (Cinda) for the 白 nstructionBank of China (the自問
ωbe established， inApr. 1999)， China Huarong Asset Management Corpぽ ationfor the lndustria1 
and Commercial Bank ofChina， Dongfang Asset Management Company (Oriental) for the Bank of 
China，細川ithe China Great Wall Asset Management Company for the Agricultural Bank of China 
available at h悦D://www.!ui.co.iD/enl!lish/ae7393asset m制限echina.h旬1.
44 Id 
45 Seι e.g.， 也er家 r~ [Guangdong Guangye Asset Management Company] at 
hto:/，川ww.chinao叫ine.comlesωre/financiallAA030-75PR.htrr1. 
46 See W ANG & BOOTH， supra note 9. 
47 These regulations replωed吐leShenzhen Bankruptcy Provisions on Foreign Related Companies 
that were enacted in 1986 before由e1986 Chinese Bankruptcy Law was promulgated. For a 
discussion of Shenzhen practice， see Zhang & Boo白，supra note 3. In Beijing there are provisions 
applicable t旧血esolvent Iiquidation of FIEs called the Liquidation Provisions of F oreign Inves回 ent
Enterprises， which were adopted by the Standing Committee of the Beijing P切 ple'sCongress on 
August 14， 1993. For a discussion ofthe Beijing practice， see Xianchu Zhang & Charles D. Bo叫1，
Beijing 's Initiative on Cross-Border J.町 olvency:Res町tio叩 ona Recent Visi( of Hong Kong 
ProfessionalsωBeijing， 10 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REv. 29 (2002). [he閃:inafterzh副19& Bo悦h，
Beijing 's Initiative on Cross-Border lnsolvency]ー
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Vietnam 
The pre・2004 insolvency law refonn landscape in Vietnam 
involved the following: 
(1) National bankruJフtcylaw and other leg，α1 provisions and 
procedures. The 1993 Vietnamese Bankruptcy Law， with 51 sections， 
was the only national bankruptcy law and applied to both SOEs and non-
SOE enterprises. It was broader than the Chinese law in that it also 
applied to enterprises without legal person status. 
Vietnam， like China， has other legislation pertaining to the solvent 
liquidation ofenterprises outside the scope ofthe bankruptcy law， notably 
the Vietnamese Foreign lnvestment Law48 (“Vietnamese FIL") and the 
Vietnamese Ente中riseLaw 2000.49 There are legislative provisions in 
these laws that direct insolvent liquidations to follow the 1993 bankruptcy 
laws. Artic1e 53 of the Vietnamese FIL provides that if in the course of 
the liquidation of組 FIEit is discovered that the FIE is on the verge of 
bankruptcy， the FIE's bankruptcy should be caηied out in accordance 
with the provisions of the laws conceming ente甲risebankruptcy.50 ln 
con仕astto Artic1e 27 of the PRC Liquidation Procedures of FIEs， Artic1e 
53 of the Vietnamese law does not provide how the bankruptcy should be 
commenced. ln addition， unlike the Chinese national FIE law， the 
Vietnamese provision applies in some cases involving the value of land 
use rights after a bankruptcy case has been commenced.51 Lastly， the 
1993 Vie白ameseBankruptcy Law overlapped with other legislation 
regarding the仕切加lentof land use rights and this was the source of many 
conflicts.52 
48 Vietnamese Forei伊 lnvestmentLaw (196)紅白. 52， 53. This replaced an earlier foreign 
investment law dating ftom 1987. This law was amended on June 9， 2000， under Law No. 
1812000/QH10 aν'ailable at h住n:lww.dni.hochiminhcitv.!:ov.vnlinv官st/h加llaw2.html
[hereinafter白eVietnamese FIL]. 百lereorganizatio四 (division，demerger， merger， or 
∞nsolidation) of祖 FIEP町田antto Articles 31釦 d32 of Vietnamese Decree No. 24 providing 
detailed regulations on th岬 implem直:ntationofthe law on foreign investment in Vietnam would also 
be outside the scope of the 193 Vietnamese Bankruptcy Law. See Joele Daumas， Socialist 
Republic 01 Viet Nam， inTHE ASIA・PACIFICRESTRUCTURING & INSOLVENCY GUIDE 2003/04 at 
173・7(203). 
49 Daumas， supra note 48. The same is回 eof a rωrganization of a solvent enterprise under也e
Vietn醐 eseEnt旬開Law200. 
;JU Si四 JOHNSON，STOKES & MASTER， VIETNAM， A GUIDE TO DOING BUSINESS 2 (202). 
引Article53.4 of the Vietnamese FIL， supra note 48， provides that where the Vie価値neseParty 
participating in a jo即時n同氏 enterprise who has contributed capital in the form of the vaIue of 
land use rights is disolved or b創ホrupt，the remaining value of血直 landuse rights con位ibutedas 
capital shal be included in the enterprise' s asets that are su句ectto the liquidation. 
o. VIETNAMESE BANKRUPTCY LAW RESEARCH REpORT， supra note 4， at Part Two， I， 5 (“Problems 
on dealing wi血仕leland use rights of ente甲，risedeclared bankrupt"). One such conflict involved a 
contest between the 193 Vietnamese Bankruptcy Law and Article 26 of出eVietnamωe Land Law 
(enacted on July 14， 193 and came into opぽationon October 15， 193)， which also aplied to 
加 曲uptcies. ld. at P副 Two，I， 5.1ω("Land回colectedby the s則的 Availableat 
htt>:/Icombs.an札 edu.aul-vernluatlen!:lishILaw-land-law.tx1，ωamendedin Nov. 198 and June 
2001. See also JOHNSON， STOKES & MASTER， supra note 50， at 24. 
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(2) Judicial interpretations and regulations. These inc1uded the 
following: Decision No. 528/QDBT， dated June 13， 1995， of the 
Vietnamese Minister of Justice， issuing Operation Regulation of the 
Trustee Committee and the Property Realization Committee; Decision 
No. 426/QD of the Vietnamese People's Supreme Court， dated July 1， 
1994， issuing Operation Regulation of the Collective of Judges 
Responsible for Handling Applications for Bankruptcy; and Official 
Letter No. 4571HKXX， dated July 21， 1994， of the Vietnamese People's 
Supreme Court， on the application of some provisions of the 1993 
Vietnamese Bankruptcy Law.53 
(3) Government decrees and regulations. Decree NO.189/CP of 
the Vietnamese government， dated December 23， 1994， guided the 
implementation of the 1993 VieむlameseBankruptcy Law (“Vietnamese 
Decree No. 189").54 Artic1e 1 provided greater detail concerning the 
scope of the ente中出essubject to the 1993 Vietnamese Bankruptcy Law， 
as including “state-owned enterprises， ente中risesof socio・political
organizations， private enterprises， limited liability companies， stock 
companies， wholly or partly foreign owned enterprises (“FIEs")， and 
cooperative groupS.，5 However， Article 2 provided that the bankruptcy 
of an FIE must comply with both the 1993 Vietnamese Bankruptcy Law 
and the Vietnamese FIL， thereby causing some difficu1ties. 56 Tbe 
promulgation of other decrees led to some overlap with the 1993 
Vietnamese Bankruptcy Law. For example， Decree No. 92/CP of the 
government， dated December 19， 1995， pertained to the settlement of 
employees' interests in bankrupt ente甲山es and included some 
provisions that set out a special priority for workers who were i吋町edin a 
labor accident or suffered仕oma disease in their course of work， which 
was inconsistent in some respects with the 1993 bankruptcy law.57 
(4) Administrative out-of-court restructuring句forts. In 1998， 
Vietnam established the National Enterprise Reform Committee (the 
“NERCワtoreactivate an equitization process for SOEs. 58 Decree 
44/l998/ND-CP， dated June 29， 1998， regulates the equitization of 
SOEs戸TheNERC has equitized more than 700 SOEs since 1999. It has 
53 VIETNAMESE BANKRUPTCY LAW RESEARCH REPORT， supra note 4， at Part One， I('‘Ac旬直I
status of enteゅrisebankruptcy law in Vie組四").
~ VIETN訓 ESE DECREE No. 189 (194)， available at h伽 :lww.vietnamese-law-
consultancv.comJsources/s b釘lkcruDtcv/bankCruDtcv12 94.htm 
" VIETNAMESE BAN臥 UPTCYLAW RESEARCH REpORT， supra no旬 4，at Part Two， 1， 2.5 ('官le
!'interprises whose bankruptcy has ben declared were mainly belonging to non-state sectors"). 
56 JOHNSON， STOKES & 1¥-仏STER，sup叩 note50， at 23. 
57 VIETNAMESE BANKRUPTCY LA W RESEARCH REpORT， s!ψra no句 4，at Part ~wo， I， 4 ("W抽
!c:spect to protection of the interests of emploγees of世leban畑中tente中rises").
58 AUSTRALIAN ECONOMIC ANALYTICAL UN1T， DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND TRADE， 
CHANGING CORPORATE ASlA: WHAT BUSINESS NEEDS TO KNow 171 (M釘 ch202)， available at 
h伽:lIww.monash.edu.aulc3sestudies/cs/416c3.h皿[hereinafter AUSTRALlAN ECONOMIC 
ANAL YTICAL UN1T， CHANGING CORPORA TE ASlA]. 
59 JOHNSON， STOKES & MASTER， supra note 50， 3t 28. 
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also pushed for the liquidation of non-viable SOEs.60 Other government 
initiatives have helped finance severance payments for workers who have 
been made redundant， have devolved control of the equitization of 
provincial SOEs to provincial governments， have restructured large 
SOEs， and have privatized small SOEs.01 Vietnam has taken steps to 
improve the banking system and， like China， has established AMCs 
connected to the commercial banks to dispose of NPLs.62 Vietnam has 
also established a national Debts and Assets Trading Company managed 
by the Ministry ofFinance.o~ 
(5) Local provisions. There are also some local laws with 
provisions regarding bankruptcy， such as the 1972 Commercial Code of 
Saigon， which pre-dated the 1993 Vietnamese Bankruptcy Law. 
There was a concem in Vietnam that some ofthe provisions in the 
1993 Vie阻ameseBankruptcy Law and the guiding implementation 
documents lacked uniformity， conflicted with other related documents， 
and therefore caused some problems for the competent bodies in the 
settlement of bankruptcy applications. 64 The bankruptcy drafting 
committee was also aware that the low rate of bankruptcy did not reflect 
the reality一也atgiven the number of enterprises in Vietnam and the 
regulatory effect of the bankruptcy law， itwas clear that， in effect， the 
official bankruptcy rates were “自ctitioUS.，65
It can be seen that the 企ameworkfor insolvency in Vietnam 
shares many simi1arities with the Chinese合amework.However， one key 
difference is that企omthe outset the Vie阻amesepromulgated one 
national bankruptcy law that applied to SOEs， legal person enterprises， 
and non-legal person enterprises.百lisbroader jurisdiction， however， did 
not lead to an increase in cases. Although the formal law was simpler， it 
was almost never utilized. 
II. SCOPE OF THE BANKRUPTCY LA WS 
Throughout the insolvency reform process， Vietnam debated， and 
China is stil debating， what the proper scope of the new laws should be. 
Among the issues that have been debated are the following: Should the 
new laws apply to al SOEs? Should the new laws apply to banks， 
60 AUSTRALIAN ECONOMIC ANAL YTICAL UNIT， CHANGING CORPORATE ASIA， supra note 58， at 
171. 
61 lc 
6位2See Hoar時 T百ie釦:nLoi， Trends and De抑v刊W叫'elo.伊>pme~凶 i仇nInsolvency 勾砂J羽1St，伝emsand Risk Management 
The Experience of Vie初am，. paper presented at the Forum on Asian Insolvency Reform 2004: 
Insolvency Systerns and Risk Managernent in Asia， held in New Delhi， India， Nov. 3-5， 2004， 
sponsored by the World Bank， the Asian Developrnent Bank， and the OECD 
"OId. 
制 VIETNAMESEBANKRUPTCY RESEARCH REpORT， supra note 4， atIn位。duction.
65Id. at Part Two， 1， 2.1. See also AUSTRALIAN ECONOMIC ANALYTICAL UNIT， CHANGING 
Co貯 O臥 TEASIA， supra note 58， at183 (citing Yo町 H，Nov. 2， 2001， which reported伽 t300 
cornpanies in 2001 alone “disappeared" wi也outgoing through the bankruptcy process). 
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insurance companies， and securities companies? Should the new laws 
apply to non-legal persons， including partnerships and sole 
proprietorships? Moreover， should the new laws extend beyond business-
related enterprises and apply to consumers? 
A. Should the law apply to SOEs? 
SOEs often provide important public goods and services. In 
addition， they provide a broad a汀ayof guaranteed benefits to由自
workers including housing， education， and health care. This can prove to 
be an especially expensive proposition if the SOE has far too many 
workers. Thus， when an SOE fi¥es for liquidation or reorganization， in
addition to addressing the business issues， it wi1l also have to satis命the
guaranteed minimum social benefits， which will likely involve the 
“resettlement" and re住ainingof many of its workers. 
China 
The Chinese have been grappling with the issues involving the 
insolvency of SOEs since the beginning of the bankruptcy law drafting 
process. The reform process was started， ingreat part， toimprove the dire 
straits of SOEs. There is no doubt that many， ifnot the majority， of state-
con仕olledenterprises in China would benefit企omthe enactment of a 
comprehensive insolvency regime. However， a dramatic increase in the 
number of SOEs filing for bankruptcy would likely lead to two other sets 
ofproblems: (1) high unemplo戸nentthat could result in social unrest， and 
(2) a knock-on effect leading to the bankruptcy of many state-owned 
banks.66 Because of these problems， and concurrently with the drafting 
process， China took other major steps to address the problems of the 
SOEs and the related problems of the high level of the NPLs owed by 
SOEs to the state-owned banks. Included in the steps are those discussed 
above in Part 1: instituting the CSOP and promulgating the 1994 and 1997 
PRC Notices， establishing AMCs， and experimenting with the Changchun 
Approach. 
Given the magnitude of the problems with the SOEs and the high 
level of govemment con位。1over the SOE reform process， itis not 
surprising that the Chinese have hotly debated whether to subject SOEs to 
the new bankruptcy regime. One of the main reasons for comrnencing the 
bankruptcy reform process was to correct the inadequacies of the 1986 
Chinese Bankruptcy Law in dealing with SOEs. Nevertheless， by 2000， it 
was clear that a split was emerging within the bankruptcy law drafting 
comrnittee. At a conference organized by the Asian Institute of 
Intemational Financial Law at the University of Hong Kong in November 
“See Zhang & Booth， supra note 3， at3. 
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2000， there was a heated discussion among drafting committee members 
as to whether the new law should apply to al SOEs or whether there 
should be a carve-out for some of the older SOES.67 This later view was 
mco甲oratedinto the 2001 and 2002 Draft Chinese Bankruptcy Laws. 
Article 3 of the 2002 draft law provided that the State Council was 
authorized to stipulate re思11ationsconcerning the special issues of 
bankruptcies conducted by SOEs that were established before 1994， when 
the PRC Company Law took effect.68 It thus appeared企omthe 2002 draft 
that only SOEs established a食erthat date would be subject to the new law 
and that the older， larger， and more inefficient SOEs would be exempt 
企omits application.69 
This exemption for the older SOEs does not appear in the October 
2004 Draft Chinese Bankruptcy Law， but the effect appears to be the 
same. Artic1e 148 of the October 2004 Draft provides that before the new 
bankruptcy is enacted， the special matter of the insolvency of SOEs 
within a certain scope and within certain deadlines previously set by the 
State Council shall be addressed by regulations prescribed by the State 
Council. Further details have emerged: the current proposal is to allow 
certain SOEs to go bar虫ruptunder relevant regulations issued by the 
State Council within the next two to three years. After that， the new law 
will handle al SOE bankruptcies.70 This exemption will apply to the 
largest of the SOEs. The State-Owned Assets Supervision and 
Adminis回 tionCommission (“SASAC勺ofthe State Council estimates 
that roughly 2，000 SOEs may take advantage of this“administrative 
c1osure.，71 The irony of the situation is that over a decade has passed 
since the Chinese began reforming their ban畑中tcylaw， and although the 
new Chinese bankruptcy law was intended to deal with serious SOE 
problems， by the time thenew law comes into operation the majority of 
SOEs in need of assistance wi1 already have been dealt with through 
bankruptcy， reorganization， merger， or other mechanisms discussed 
above. Early ambitions have given way to a pragmatic administrative 
日 S戸nposium，Chinese lnsolvency Law‘ The Need ω Develop An 互依ctivelnsolvency 
lnfrastruc似陀， organized by出直 AsianInstitute of Intemational Financial Law at血eUniversity of 
Hong Kong (Nov. 17・18，2000). See a/so Booth， supra note 12， at 15. 
一Earlierlanguage ω血iseffect appeared in Article 168 of仕le2001 Dra食ChineseBankruptcy Law. 
田Althoughit remained unclear whether the older SOEs would be subject ωnew regu1ations or 
remain subject to血e1986 Chinese Bankruptcy Law. Article 162 of白e2002 Draft Chines巴
Bankruptcy Law provided for曲直 abolitionof白e1986 law upon the enactment of the new law， but 
at a works加pin which 1 p釘 ticipat耳d白atwas organized by the Finance and Econornic Comrnittee 
ofthe Nationa1 People's Congress ofthe P国，ple's Republic of China and held in Beijing， China， in 
Apr. 2002， members ofthe bankruptcy law dra食ingcommittee noted白紙 perhaps也eold law would 
αon血ueto叩plyωtheseold SOEs until new陀伊lationswere drafted 
山 L組Xinhen，Outdated Bankruptcy Law Upgradedο004) available at 
htto:! /www.bireview.com.cn/200430IBusiness-200430(s).hun. But see PricewaterhouseCoopers， 
αina's n仰 bankrup化y law: 1百e start of something big? (2004) available at 
h首D:!/WWW.DWchk.com/horne/Drintem!lcnb誼lkruntcvlaw oct2004.html. which notes血at也is
rle~od .of e~~~p出n may extend for仕立eeωfiveyear冨
• See Lan Xinhen supra note 70， at1. 
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solution. However， after the period for administrative closure has 
expired， one of the main advantages of the new law over current practice 
will be the unification ofthe law and treating the bankruptcy ofSOEs and 
non-SOE legal persons under the same legal企amework.
The new law wi1l also include a significant policy change企om
current law. Under the 1986 Chinese Bankruptcy Law， an SOE may not 
file for bankruptcy without first getting permission to proceed企omthe 
government authority in charge.72 This requirement for first obtaining the 
permission of the government authority has been removed from the draft 
bankruptcy laws.73 Deletion ofthis requirement wil¥ arguably weaken the 
power that local government authorities exercise over SOEs subject to 
their control. Similar changes will also apply in cases against SOEs 
commenced by creditors' petitions. At present， under Article 3 of the 
1986 PRC Chinese Bankruptcy Law， the People's Court will not enter a 
bankruptcy declaration against “public ente中出esand enterprises which 
have an important relationship to the national economy and to出e
people's livelihood" (a public interest exception) unless the relevant 
government authority in charge has not provided fmancial assistance or 
adopted other measures to assist the enterprise in repaying its debts. In 
other words， ifa creditor petitions for bankruptcy against such an SOE 
and the relevant government authority decides to provide financial 
assistance， the bankruptcy declaration can be avoided. If the government 
authority decides not to provide fmancial assistance， the declaration may 
be made. Furthermore， in a case commenced by a creditor' s petition 
against an SOE， the government authority may delay the making of a 
bankruptcy declaration by filing a reorganization plan.74 The October 
2004 Draft Chinese Bankruptcy Law no longer includes these exceptions， 
which wi1l further erode the con仕01ofthe local government authorities. 
Vietnam 
Al血oughVie回am，like China， adopt吋 amulti-pronged approach 
to deal with the problems caused by the financial weaknesses of SOEs， 
the issue of whether the new bankruptcy law should apply to SOEs does 
72 1986 Chinese Bankruptcy Law art. 8; 2002 Supreme People's Court Provisions art. 5. The law 
a即 E釘 sto require only govemment approval for a debtor' s petition， but tbe reality is也at也e
approval of tbe relevant state autborities is always 印刷ired.See also Zhang & Bo白血，supra note 3， 
in notes 25・27and accompanying text. In fac!，由elocal autborities are reluctant to grant也eir
approval， because也ey訂'eresponsible for resettling tbe employees after the bankruptcy of the SOE. 
$.e also Lan， supra note 70， at 1. 
プSee. e.g.也e2002釦 dJune釦 dOctober 2004 Draft Chinese Ba且畑中tcyLaws目
円 SeeChang， supra note 17. See art. 17 of吐le1986 Chinese Bankruptcy Law and art. 28 of由E
2002 PRC Supreme People's Court Provisions: Article 17 of the 1986 law provides血at血e
application for reorganization must be filed by the govemment authority within three mon也Softbe 
白.tethe People's Court aωepts血ebankruptcy case and出at血ereorganization must be completed 
wi白intwo years. Article 28 of the 2002 provisions fur出erprovides tbat由eapplication must be 
創edbefore tbe People's Court enters the ban畑中tcydeclaration. 
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not appear to have been a controversial one in Vietnam. Under the 1993 
Vietnamese Bankruptcy Law， very few SOEs actual1y resorted to the 
procedure -at the end of 1999， only ten SOEs and two state-owned 
cooperative groups had been declared bankrupt. 7S Reasons for this low 
rate inc1uded the fol1owing factors: 
(1) SOEs are entitled to various forms of preferential 
treatment釘ldstate provided assistance in running their 
business; 
(2) The courts would only consider issuing bankruptcy 
applications against SOEs after the relevant state authority 
had issued a decision not to adopt measures necessary to 
assist the repa戸nentof debts; 
(3) Some state authorities and agencies were not sufficiently 
aware of the importance of the 1993 Vietnamese 
Bankruptcy Law; 
(4) State authorities 0食enfailed to decide (or when they 
decided， fai1ed to do so clearly and definitely) whether to 
apply for a dec1aration of insolvency or to seek dissolution 
of the enterprise， with the result that SOEs were 0食en
allowed by the superior agencies to be dissolved instead 
of being declared bankrupt under the 1993 Vietnamese 
Bankruptcy Law下
It is c1ear that in Vietnarn， as in China， the relevant government 
authorities played an integral role in determining whether an SOE should 
file for bankruptcy. However， the articles regarding the petition make no 
mention of the need to secure the approval of the relevant government 
authority.77 
One of the primary goals of the Vietnarnese reform process was to 
enact a new law that would be utilized by more SOEs. The extent to 
which this goal is achieved wi1l be dependent in great part on whether 
SOEs are confident that the new law offers enough substantive 
improvements over the old law and whether the necessary supporting 
m企as仕邸側reis in place to ensure the efficient operation ofthe new law. 
Both the 2002 draft and the 2004 Vietnamese Bankruptcy Law 
retain the unified approach in which the same rules apply to SOE and 
non-SOE enterprises. Both the draft law and the current Jaw also retain a 
limited exemption from Section 1 of the 1993 Vie臼lameseBankruptcy 
75 
76VIETNAMESE BANKRUFTCY LAW RESEARCH REPORT，supra note 4，at Pan Two，1325. 
o ld. 
77 1993 Vietnamese Bankruptcy Law山.7 (creditor's petition)， 8 (worker's petition)， 9 (debtor's 
petition). Compare with 1986 Chinese B組むuptcyLaw art. 8 (requiring approva1 in the case of a 
debtor's petition). 
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Law for some SOEs engaged in providing public services， national 
defense， andlor security.78 Revised Article 2.2 provides that: 
The Government shall make detailed provisions on the list of 
enterprises and the application of this Law to special 
ente中 市esthat directly serve the national defense and 
security， enterprises and cooperatives that operate in the fields 
of fmance， and banking and insurance and other fields that 
provide essential products and public service on a regular and 
direct basis.79 
The new 2004 Vie白ameseBankruptcy Law thus applies to al SOEs， with 
the exception that Article 2.2 provides that the government shall 
promulgate “detailed provisions" on the application of the new 
bankruptcy law to the narrow category of “special enterprises." As is 
discussed below， the category of exempt enterprises in China is narrower 
and only applies to enterprises operating in the areas ofbanking， fmance， 
and insurance. 
B. Should the law apply to bαnks， insurance companies， and 
securities companies? 
There is no intemational consensus about whether the bankruptcy 
of banks， insurance companies， securities companies， and other financial 
institutions should be handled under bankruptcy laws or under separate 
laws. For example， the United States generally excludes these entities 
企omthe U. S. Bankruptcy Code.80 On the other hand， Hong Kong relies 
on an old English company law approach in which the company law 
includes both insolvency-related comrnencement criteria as well as non-
insolvency regulatory grounds for winding-up companies in regulated 
indus住iessuch as bank~g and insurance.81 
18 Under the 1993 Vietnamese Bankruptcy Law， a bankruptcy case against SOEs oper司自19in these 
areas could not proceed田山s也eCourt received a leter of authorization from白ePrime Minister 
or the head of白egovernment agency that established the busin巴s.JOHNSON， STOKES & MASTER， 
supra note 50， at22. 
19-2004 Vietnamese Bankruptcy Law art. 2(2). 
回 Moreparticularly， in the United 8tates， ba且ks組 dinsurance companies are excluded from both 
the Iiquidation and reorganization provisions in the U.8. Bankruptcy Code (I1 U.8目c.9 1 09(b )(2)， 
(b )(3)， & (d) (2005)) and stockbrokers and commodity brokers are excJuded from也ereorgaruzahon 
provisions (Id. S 109(d)). 
制 Forexample， petitions based on these non-insolvency related grounds， called“public interest" 
petitions，訂eh組d1edunder血E凶切Iinsolvency provisions in the H. K. Companies Ordinance 
(cap. 32) as supp1emented or amended by relevant provisions in曲elegislation that directly applies 
ω 世間 regulatedindus町• See Ch副 esD. Boo由， 附 enGovernment Intervenes: Winding ゆ
Fraudulent Companies in Hong Kong， 29 HONG KONG 1.J. 368 (1999). 
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Artic1e 71 of the PRC Commercial Bank Law provides that a 
commercial bank not paying its debts may， with the consent of the China 
Banking Regulatory Commission， be declared bankrupt by a People's 
Court. A similar provision is inc1uded in Article 86 of the PRC Insurance 
Law， subject to the approval of the China Insurance Regulatory 
Commission. Both of these provisions provide for白eappointment of a 
liquidation team and the banking provision. Section 71 also inc1udes a 
paragraph setting out白atthe甲a戸nentof the principal of savings 
deposits of individuals and interest thereon shall be given a priority after 
the liquidation expenses， the wages owed to the employees and labor 
insurance premiums have been paid." That is the ful extent of the 
discussion of bankruptcy in these two laws. It is noteworthy， and 
unfortunate， that neither ofthese provisions refers to the 1986 Bankruptcy 
Law， the PRC Civil Procedure Law， nor the PRC Company Law.82 
The 2002 Draft Chinese Bankruptcy Law exp1icitly excluded 
commercial banks仕omthe scope of coverage. 83 There was a view among 
some that the new bankruptcy law should apply ωcommercial banks and 
insurance companies， but that securities companies and trust companies 
would not be mentioned explicitly for fear that they would seek special 
treatment.明Thisview， however， did not ca町 theday and the exc1usion 
was ca出edover into the June and October 2004 drafts. Artic1e 149 of 
the October 2004 Draft Chinese Bankruptcy Law provides that the 
insolvency of banks， insurance companies， and other financial 
organizations shall be govemed by implementation regulations based on 
the new bankrupt芯ylaw and related laws to be issued by the State 
Council. The matter has not been finalized， however. This is one issue 
sti1l being debated by the drafting committee and the ultimate trea加lent
sti1l remains uncertain. 
Vietnam 
The 1993 Vietnamese Bankruptcy Law did not extend to banking， 
fmancial， or insurance entities.85 The 2002 Draft Vietnamese Bankruptcy 
Law expressly took financial， monetary， and insurance business outside 
the scope of the new law through the interaction of Sections 1.2 and 6.5. 
This exc1usion was carried over into Artic1e 2.2 of the 2004 Vietnamese 
82 See Hanner， supra note 17， at2573 (discussing the bank provision). 
83 2002 Draft Chin間 BankruptcyLaw副 .160.
胴 Thesecurities finns in China are arguab1y in a rnore precarious situation也anthe Chinese banks. 
See REpORT ON THE 2004 SYMPOSIUM ON BUILDINO THE FINANCIAL SYSTEM OF THE 21ST 
CENTURY: AN AOENDA FOR CHINA AND T田 UNlTEDSTATES， heJd in Beijing， China (June 1・13，
2004)， at21. 
85 
See VIETNAMESE BANKRUPTCY LA W RESEARCH REPORT， supra note 4， atPart One， II， 3.5. 
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Bankruptcy Law in the same form as the treatment for excluded SOEs. 
The govemment is to make “detailed provisions" on the application of the 
new bankruptcy law to“enterprises and cooperatives which operate in the 
fields of finance， banking and insurance." This is similar to the approach 
adopted by China for these institutions， except that the Vietnamese 
provision refers solely to the bankruptcy law and not to bankruptcy and 
“related laws." 
C. Should the law apply only to legal persons or should it 
also applyωpar的ershipsand sole proprietors? 
As noted above， the PRC Civil Procedure Law applies only to 
non-SOE legal person ente中rises，and Article 206 explicitly excludes 
individual businesses (e.g.， sole proprietorships) and partnerships formed 
by private individuals. The 2002 Draft Chinese Bankruptcy Law rejected 
this approach. Article 3 expressly included partnership enterprises and 
their partners， individual proprietorship enterprises， and other profit-
making organizations that are established in accordance with the law. 
The enactment of this article would have dramatical1y expanded the scope 
of the new bankruptcy law to that of a far-ranging business bankruptcy 
law. However， the October 2004 dra食 returnedto the position in the 
current PRC Civil Procedure Law. Article 2 of the October 2004 draft 
expressly applies to debtors that are legal person enterprises and the 
revised Article 147 provides that the bankruptcy of pa出lershipsand sole 
proprietorships shal1 be dealt with under other related laws. The Chinese 
bankruptcy reform process on this issue has thus come ful circle. 
However， the issue has not yet been conclusively resolved， as it is 
understood that there is stil some support for including partnerships組 d
sole proprietors in the new law. 
Vietnam 
The situation in Vietnam was quite different. Unlike the Chinese 
law， the 1993 Vie包lameseBankruptcy Law applied to a broad range of 
both legal person and non-legal person enterprises. Section 1 of this law 
applied this law “to al forms of business ownership" and Vie位lamese
Decree 189 provided further details as to the scope of application as 
induding prlvate enterprises. 86 Partnerships were also covered. 87 An 
86 See supra note 54 and accomp釦 lyingtext 
。'p紅白ぽshipswe問 includedp町 suantto the generallanguage in Article 1 of血e1993 Vietnamese 
Bankruptcy Law. VIETNAMESE BANKRUPTCY LA W RESEARCH REpORT， supra note 4， atPart One， 
II， 1.1 (“Limits on the subjects to apply bankruptcy procedures"). In Vietnam， a partnership is 
defin吋 as組 enterprise，which must have at least two partners (who釘 epersonally liable for the 
finn's obligations)， in addition to equity contribution members (whose liability is limited by白
levelof也eircapita1 con飢 butions).JOHNSON， STOKES & MAs花 R，supra note 50， at27. (“Unlike 
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impetus in the ear1y drafting was to expand further the scope of the law to 
inc1ude some non-private enterprises such as household businesses. It 
was noted that although both private businesses and household businesses 
had unlimited liability and although neither was a legal person， under the 
old law private enterprises were allowed to file for bankruptcy to release 
their obligations， but household businesses were not permi仕edto do SO.88 
The drafting of血e2002 Draft Vietnamese Bankruptcy Law was 
influenced by these arguments in favor of expanding the scope of 
application， aswell as by arguments that the defmed category for the new 
law should be a “merchant，" which under Artic1e 35.1 of the Vietnamese 
Comrnercial Law extended to organizations， individuals， legal persons， 
households， or cooperatives.日 Thus，Section 1.1 of the 2002 Dra食
Vietnamese Bankruptcy Law stated血atthe new law would be applicable 
to merchants who had fallen into a bankrupt situation. Section 6.4， in 
turn， defined merchant quite expansively as including the following: 
Individuals， collective groups， households， collectives， limited 
liability companies， holding companies， partnerships， private 
enterprises， ente中riseswith partly foreign invested capital， 
enterprises with 100% foreign invested capital， ente甲nses
belonging to political or social organizations， state ente中rises，
and those that have a business regis回 tioncertificate and 
operate independent1y and continuously. 
The 2002 Vietnamese draft， however， did carve out an exception for 
small-scale sole proprietorships， namely hawkers and nosh vendors with 
low business capital， tumover， and income.90 
Interestingly， the Vietnamese， like the Chinese， retreated企om
their expansive draft and returned to notions in their existing law. Thus， 
Article 2 provides that the new law applies to al enterprises， cooperatives 
and cooperative unions. The expansive definition in Section 6.4 of the 
2002 Draft Vietnamese Bankruptcy Law was deleted and no new 
definition inserted. Instead， a series of provisions企'omArtic1e 15 
through Article 18 provide for who may file the petitions on behalf of the 
debtors that are able to use the new law -enterprises and cooperatives 
(Article 15)， SOEs (Article 16)， joint stock companies (Article 17)， and 
partnerships (Artic1e 18). Sole proprietor private ente中risesare inc1uded 
(Article 15)， but household businesses are not. Although pa口nershipsand 
sole proprietorship private enterprises are inc1uded in the scope of the 
limited liability and shareholding companies白econcept of partnerships is new in Vietnam and their 
status， therefore， is less clear. ") 
SS VIETNAMESE 8ANKRUPTCY LAW RESEARCH REpORT， supra note 4， at P副Three，I， 1 (“On 
ilPplicable scale of the Bankruptcy Law"). 
90 
2002 Draft Vietnamese Bankruptcy Law ~ 1.3. 
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new law， there are no provisions that address the possibility of a 
discharge or an entitlement to retain exempt propeロy.
Summary 
It is unfortunate that Vietnam， like China， re甘eated企omits more 
expansive jurisdiction， although the position to which the Vietnamese law 
has returned is broader than the existing (and proposed) Chinese position. 
Business entities that are not covered by the new laws stil need to raise 
capital and have creditors. By excluding these debtors合omthe new law， 
the government policy discriminates against these other forms of 
business.91 
D. Should the law appかtoconsumers? 
When China enacted its bankruptcy law in 1986 and Vietnam in 
1993， the debate in each coun仕yfocused on which business enterprises 
should be permitted to utilize the new proced町 e. It was too early to raise 
even the possibility of consumer bankruptcy legislation and consumers 
were le食 outsidethe scope of the new laws. In con甘ast，in the United 
States consumer petitions comprise the great m司orityof bankruptcy 
petitions 92 (more than 1，000，000 individuals file for bankruptcy every 
year)戸Thenumber of people who file for bankruptcy annually is greater 
than the number of people who have a heart attack， are diagnosed with 
cancer， graduate仕omcollege， or file for divorce.94 Thus， itmay be 
difficult for Americans to envision a coun句 whereconsumers are not 
permitted to file for bankruptcy. However， given that even early English 
and U.S. bankruptcy laws were applicable only to merchants or to others 
engaged in commerce， 95it should not be surprising that China and 
Vietnam， which have only enacted bankruptcy laws over the last two 
decades， have excluded consumers仕omthe application ofthe law. 
At the time that bankruptcy laws were being introduced in China 
and Vietnam， each coun仕ywas in only the initial stage of making the 
transition企oma planned economy to a market-based economy; therefore， 
there were few opportunities for consumer finance. However， a strong 
argument can be made that the China and the Vietnam oftoday， with their 
91 VIETNAMESE 8ANKRUPTCY LA W RESEARCH REpORい 1仰 no叫 atPart Three， I， 1 
出 8etween97%・98%for each year from 2000ω 2004. News Release 01 the Administrative Office 
o[ the u.s. Courts (Dec. 3， 2004) available at h伽・//v.明W.凶 courts.l!ovlPr官S5Re¥eases/ゐ04bk.odf.
ヲJFrom 2000 to 2004， the nurnber of non-business fi¥ings ranged from a ¥ow of ¥ ，226，037 (2000)ω 
a high of 1，625，813 (2003). ld. 
94 ELlZABETH W ARR凹 &AMELIA WARREN TYAGI， THE TwO-INCOME TRAP: WHY MIDDLE 
C:LASS PARENTS ARE GoING 8ROKE 6 (2003). 
ヲ~ See. e.g. 13 E¥iz. ch. 7 (1571) in Eng¥and and the Bankruptcy Act of t 800白血eUnited States 
DOUGLAS G. 8AIRD & THOMAS H. JACKSON， CASES， PROBLEMS， AND MATERIALS ON 
BANKRUPTCY 27・3t (2nd ed.， t 990). 
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emerging middle c1asses and increased consumer financing and 
spending，96 should now expand the coverage of the laws beyond their 
business-oriented origins. Although during the drafting process there was 
some limited support in both China and Vietnam for enacting a 
comprehensive bankruptcy law that also applied to consumers， this was 
c1ear1y the minority view， and neither the new Vietnamese bankruptcy 
law nor the October 2004 Chinese draft has moved in this direction. Of 
course， as the purchasing power of consumers increases and a larger 
percentage of such purch邸 esare made on credit， it is only a matter of 
time before both countries wil1 have to reconsider this issue.97 
The Chinese and the Vietnamese have been approaching the issue 
of sole proprietorship and partnership bankruptcies企omthe perspective 
of business bankruptcies. However， inc1uding these categories in the 
bankruptcy law also has benefits 仕om a consumer bankruptcy 
perspective. Applying a bankruptcy law to individual business owners 
and partnerships enables courts to gain experience grappling with the 
types of issues that arise with individual bankruptcies， such as血e
automatic discharge and exempt property， and provides the courts with a 
head start for the day when consumer bankruptcy laws wi1l have to be 
enacted. 
IV. BANKRUPTCY ADMINISTRATION 
There are a variety of ways to structure the administration of 
bankruptcy cases and many questions to be debated by law reformers: 
Should an outside trustee be appointed? What role are creditors allowed 
to play? How active should the court and the government be in the 
process? Are there proper checks and balances? The Chinese and 
Vietnamese have addressed these issues and both the October 2004 Draft 
Chinese Bankruptcy Law and the 2004 Vietnamese Bankruptcy Law 
improve upon the organizational structures for the administration of 
bankruptcies contained in the 2002 drafts and in the older laws. 
China 
A major innovation that has emerged企omthe drafting process in 
China is the introduction of a new白nctionaryin the bankruptcy 
96 For example， during the SARS scare in Beijing in 2005， car sales boomed; in April 2003， 50% of 
也esales were on installment. See Aulo Markel 10 Main削 nF.ω1Growth， XINHUA NEWS AGENCY， 
i¥1ay 30， 2003 avai/，αble al htto:/，八101WW.china. orl!.cn/em!lishl2003ゐ1av/65827目h回.
ヲ， For a comprehensive analysis of the relation直hipbetween∞nsumer credit and personal 
ba歯 uptcylaw reform in China， see Xian・ChuZhan唱，Development of Consumer Credil in China 
and Concerns about the Underら!ingLegal lnfrastructure (Chapter 5) in JOHANNA NIE叩-
KrE回LAINEN，IAIN RAMSAY & WILLlAM C. WHITFORD (eds.)， CONSUMER BANKRUPTCY悶
GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE (2003). 
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procedure called an“adminis回 tor"to take control of the debtor' s assets 
and exercise a broad range of administrative responsibilities. This 
innovation appears as a new Chapter凹 inthe October 2004 Draft 
Chinese Bankruptcy Law98 (it was a chapter section in the 2002 draft).99 
The post of administrator does not exist under the current bankruptcy 
regime. In bankruptcies under current Chinese law， a trustee or 
administrator is not appointed. Rather， the court establishes a liquidation 
committee. Article 47 of the 2002 Supreme People's Court Provisions 
provides that in cases under the 1986 Chinese Bankruptcy Law， within 15 
days of declaring the enterprise bankrupt， the court shall establish a 
liquidation committee. Article 48 provides that the committee may 
consist of members chosen企omthe superior departrnent in charge of the 
SOE (if the case involves an SOE); liquidation-related intermediary 
organizations; relevant government departrnents (including tinancial 
departrnents， administrations for industry and commerce， planning 
commissions， etc.); and professionals， including lawyers and 
accountants. 10 In practice， professionals are rarely appointed to the 
committee， and， in the bankruptcy of non-SOEs， the liquidation 
committee usually plays a minor role.101 
A further problem under current law flows企omthe fact that the 
liquidation committee is not appointed when the cOurt accepts the case， 
but rather within 15 days ofthe date that the cOurt makes the adjudication 
order. Thus， during the gap period， which can be lengthy， there is no one 
in charge to prevent existing management仕ommisappropriating the 
debtor's assets.1υ2 
The introduction of the office of the administrator should address 
many of the infrrmities in the current law. First， the administrator (or 
administrators， as it appears that in effect a team of administrators may be 
appointed) shall be appointed仕omthe day the case is accepted.103 
Second， an administrator will be a professional -either an individual or a 
relevant social intermediary - with the necessary expertise and 
background to perform the responsibilities. An individual may be a 
:~ See 2004 Draft Chinese 8ankruptcy Law釘包.19-27. 
99 See 2002 Draft Chin悶 B印 刷ptcyLaw山 .27但.
叩 Seealso 1986 Chinese 8ankruptcy Law art. 23 (for SOEs); PRC Civil Procedure Law art. 201 
(for non-SOEs); PRC Company Law art. 189 (for companies). The re1evant government 
d.ep釘 加entsoften designate mer巾ersofthe comite. See Lぃupranote 17， at 13. 
;:Li，sψra note 17， at 13 
2 Wang Weiguo， Administrator in New Bankrupt，の，Law of China， paper presented at the Forum on 
Asian lnso1vency Refonn 204: Insolvency Systems釦 dRisk Management in Asia， held in New 
De血i，lndia， Nov. 3・5，2004， sponsored by the Wor1d Bank， the Asian Deve10pment Bank，組d由e
OECD. Artic1e 18of出e2002 Supreme People's Court Provisions adreses in p副社lIs“gap
period" problem by providing the court upon acepting a bankruptcy case with the power to apoint 
“~'!Il enterprise management comite." 
山 October2004 Draft Chinese Bankruptcy Law art. 19; 202 Draft Chinese Bankruptcy Law art. 
16. The day the case is acepted is also when the automatic stay on unsecured c陀 ditorscomes into 
operation. October 2004 Draft Chinese Bankruptcy Law art. 30; 202 Draft Chinese 8ankruptcy 
Lawart. 19. 
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lawyer or certified public accountant， and relevant social intennediaries104 
may be drawn from law firms， accounting fmns， and bankruptcy and 
liquidation fmns.105 Adminis仕atorsshould have professional expertise 
and qualifications， and individuals should carry liability insurance.106 The 
Supreme People's Court shall establish further details regarding the 
qualifications of， and appointment methods for， the administrator.107 
Eventually， there will be a special license required of insolvency 
adminis住atorsand a unified examination will be established.108 
Article 22 of the October 2004 Draft Chinese Bankruptcy Law， 
(Article 27 in the 2002 draft) sets out criteria that disqualify an individual 
or institution仕omappolD出lent，including' a prior criminal record， 
revocation of a professionallicense， being an interested party in the case， 
or being thought of by the People's Court to be otherwise inappropriate 
for appoin加lent. Other provisions provide for situations in which the 
administrator is negligent， incompetent， or commits unlawful or wrongful 
acts.百leinstitution ofthe administrator will play a major role in the new 
bankruptcy procedure.109 The administrator will be able to hire sta首.10
Unlike the current liquidation team， the adminisむator(or administration 
team) will be a disinterested and neutral party. 
Article 29 of the October 2004 Draft Chinese Bankruptcy Law 
authorizes the administrator to take over al of the debtor' s property企om
the date of appoin加lentby the People' s Court. 11 Article 23 sets out a 
broad list of administrative functions that the administrator shall perform 
a食erhis designation:12 
(1) taking over al of the debtor's property， accounting 
books， documents， data， seals， and other articles; 
(2) investigating into the debtor's prope武y，status， and civil 
activities， including salaries owed to laborers， owed costs 
for social security and tax owed by the debtor; 
(3) making a report on the investigation into the financial 
status; 
(4) determining the intemal management afi白irsof the 
debtor; 
104 October 2004 Draft Chinese Bankruptcy Law art. 21; 2002 Draft Chinese Bankruptcy Law art. 
27. 
105 See Li， supra note 17， at 13. 
DO帥ぽ20似DraftChinese B拙岬町L…2
Id.; compare with 202 Draft Chinese Bankruptcy Law art. 27 (speci今回E也atthe State Council 
would be responsible for this). 
108 Wang， supra note 102， at 3. 
1090ctober 2004 Draft Chinese Bankruptcy Law art. 27; 2002 Dra食ChineseBankruptcy Law紅白.
26，27. 
10 October 2004 Dra食ChineseBankruptcy Law副 .26.
1 20但 DraftChinese加 olvencyLaw art. 25. 
山Itdel etes one釦nction合omArticle 29 of吐le202 Draft Chinese Banlαuptcy Law and changes 
the order of priority. 
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(5) employing necessary managing personnel， professional 
technicians and other 湖町;
(6) determining whether or not the debtor shal continue to 
operate the business before the convention of the first 
creditors' meeting; 
(7) managing and handling the debtor's property; 
(8) accepting the property delivery by a third pa向rto the 
debtor; 
(9) participating in a lawsuit or an arbitration concerning the 
disputes over the debtor's property and dis位ibutionof the 
bankrupt property; 
(10) cal1ing for the convening ofthe creditors' meeting; and 
(11) other rights that the court thinks shall be exercised by the 
administrator. 
ln addition to these functions set out in Chapter II， there are 
many other functions to be exercised by the administrator that are set out 
in other chapters of the draft law. These range合omseeking application 
of the avoidance powers to raising objections to creditors' claims to 
playing an integral role in the reorganization.113 If a reorganization is 
attempted， the administrator is intended to play the leading role， unless 
the debtor chooses to retain con仕01of the business -under a modified 
debtor-in-possession approach -in which case the administrator will 
supervise the debtor.114 
The most contentious issue regarding the administrator is who 
should have the power of appointment. Article 16 of the 2002 dra食
provided that the People's Court would designate an administrator when 
accepting an application for bankruptcy， but Article 56(2) of the 2002 
draft provided that when the case was underway， the creditors' meeting 
had the power to select， appo担t，and replace the administrator. This 
procedure has been modified in the October 2004 draft. Artic1e 19 ofthe 
October 2004 Draft Chinese Bankruptcy Law now provides that the 
administrator shal1 be appointed by the court. Where the creditors' 
meeting thinks that the adminis位atorcannot perform his duty fairly or is 
not competent， it may apply to the court to dismiss the administrator and 
appoint another one.115 Some groups are unhappy at this demotion of the 
role of the creditors in the current dra食. Some members of the drafting 
committee argued in favor of the doctrine in which the adminis甘ator
would be a “representative ofthe creditors，" but ultimately the majority of 
the committee opted for the administrator serving as a “legal organ" 
113 For a comprehensive list of白esefunctions， see Wang， supra note 102， at3. 
114 See discussion iψ'aP制 IV.
115 October 2004 Draft Chinese Bankruptcy Law art. 19. 
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independent of the creditors. 16 The power of appointment is one of the 
other issues血athas not yet been fully resolved. 
Another issue that has proved controversial is the process for the 
supervision of the administrator. The 2002 Draft Chinese Bankruptcy 
Law established an office called the “supervisor."1l7 Article 62 of the 
2002 draft provided that the creditors' meeting could select up to three 
supervisors. One of the weaknesses of the 2002' draft was that it was 
unclear what the lines of demarcation were among the supervisors， the 
People's Co町 t，and the creditors' meeting in supervising the 
adminis仕ator.18The October 2004 draft makes important improvements 
in this area. The office of the supervisor has been abolished. In its place， 
a creditors' committee has been established. Article 62 of the October 
2004 Draft Bankruptcy Law provides that the creditors' meeting may 
select up to nine members， who then need to be affirmed by the court.119 
Members may include creditors or their representatives， and must include 
at least one worker or workers' representative. The creditors' committee 
is intended to play much more than a merely symbolic role in the 
process. 120 Article 63 provides that the creditors' committee shall 
supervise the management and handling of the debtor' s property and is 
entitled to request the administrator to make explanations or to supply 
relevant documents. The committee may seek rulings by the People's 
Court where an adminis仕atorviolates the bankruptcy law and refuses to 
accept supervision. In addition， Article 64 of the October 2004 draft 
requires the administrator to report in a timely fashion on twelve major 
activities to the creditors' committee. These activities include， inter alia， 
transferring the ownership of real property， transferring property rights， 
transferring al of the company's stock or business operations， and 
requesting the performance of a bilateral contract. If the administrator 
wants to undertake an activi守 specifiedin Article 64 before the 
convening of the first creditors' meeting， and thus before the creditors' 
committee has been formed， then the adminis仕atoris required to obtain 
permission企omthe People's COurt.121 Article 20 of the October 2004 
dra食 alsoprovides that the administrator must appear before the creditors 
to report on his activities and answer any enquiries. 
The creation of the administrator post wi1 have a significant 
effec 
::;wmg，岬ranote肌 at2 
1182002Draa Chinese Bankruptcy Law，Chapter V，S2. 
。SeeBooth & Chiu in the note referenced in the title of this article 
19 A creditor chairs the creditors' meting. October 2004 Draft Chinese Bankruptcy Law art. 55. 
The same was仕ueunder Article 55 ofthe 2002 Draft Chinese B創立ruptcyLaw. 
:;:wmMpronotemat3 
October 2004 Draft Chinese Bankruptcy Law art. 24. 
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insolvency professionals will be more likely to gain the confidence of 
creditors. The proposed law also strikes the proper balance among the 
adminis仕ator，the court， and the creditors. The creation of a creditors' 
committee should make the process more transparent and keep creditors 
well informed. Active committees will help ensure that administrators 
perform efficiently and comply with the new procedures. It will be 
interesting to see to what extent foreign creditors (especially foreign 
banks) choose to participate in the process and seek appointment to the 
committee. 
It has been noted that after implementation ofthe new bankruptcy 
law， ‘“‘ban此1水歯k釘ru叫叩1申pt旬C句yadr立ml
Chi加na."122 In the short term， a key goal will be to fmd qualified 
individuals and institutions willing to serve in this capacity. Foreign 
accounting and law firms with expertise in these matters in other 
jurisdictions will likely seek to be appointed. However， inthe long term 
it is crucial that China develop expertise domestical1y. China needs to 
establish a training and education program for potential administrators as 
soon as possible after the enactment of the new laws.123 Another way to 
address this problem would be for the government to take a leading role 
and create a new administrative agency within China with the 
responsibility for administering bankruptcies， akin to the Official 
Receiver's Office that exists in many jurisdictions. The responsibilities 
of this office could include assisting with regulatory matters， such as 
licensing administrators and monitoring administrators in bankruptcies. 
In the first few years， the office could also actually provide staff to serve 
as adminis住atorsin bankruptcy cases， or at least in cases with insufficient 
assets to attract members of the professions.124 
Vietnam 
Under the 1993 Vie加ameseBankruptcy Law， once the court 
decided to proceed with the bankruptcy case (under Section 15 of the 
1993 Vietnamese Bankruptcy Law)， the debtor continued to manage the 
enterprise subject to the supervision of the court and a trustee 
committee125 (which was also called a “property management te創n"or an 
“asset management team"). After making the decision to proceed with 
the bankruptcy case， the court would initiate a mandated conciliation and 
reorganization process. If the conciliation and reorganization stage did 
not succeed， the court would dec1are the business bankrupt p町 suantto 
Section 36 of the 1993 Vietnamese Bankruptcy Law. Pursuant to Section 
42， upon the making of the declaration of bankruptcy， a property 
122 Wang， supra note 102， at4. 
…See Booth， Lees， Pitney & Tabb in the note referenced in the title of this胡 icle，at 7 
124 Jd. 
125 See 1993 Vietnamese B拙 ruptcyLaw g 17 (回steecommittee)， 18 (court). 
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settlement team (also called an asset liquidation team or prope口y
realization team) would be created and would be permi悦 dto include 
members of the property management team. In theory， the first stage 
appears to include a modified debtor-in-possession reorganization 
procedure， but the realiザ underthe 1993 Vietnamese Bankruptcy Law 
was that“the opening of bankruptcy proceedings [was] for the pu叩oseof 
liquidation rather than rehabilitation ofthe insolvent enterprises.，126 Thus， 
one of the unique aspects of仕le1993 Vietnamese Bankruptcy Law was 
the adaptation of a modified debtor-in-possession approach to 
bankruptcy. 
Article 17 of Vietnamese Decree 189 provided that the trustee 
committee was to consist of an officer of the Economic Court nominated 
by the Chief Justice of the provincial People's Court as the Chairman， an 
enforcement officer of the Judgment Execution Office nominated by the 
head of the Judgment Execution Office，127 the creditor holding the largest 
debt， a representative of the debtor， a trade union representative， a 
representative of the Department of Finance， a representative of the 
provincial state bank， and， as necess町y，experts企omother specialist 
branches.128 The 1993 law did not intend for the trustee committee to 
participate in and interfere with the running of the enterprise， which was 
stil the responsibility of the enterprise' s management.129 Other functions 
(e.g.， to enforce the bankruptcy judgment over the enterprise) were 
carried out later (after the making of the bankruptcy declaration) by the 
property realization team， which was also comprised of government 
officials and creditor and debtor representatives， who could also have 
served on the property management team. ¥30 These teams with their 
hybrid composition exercised functions that in other jurisdictions are 
normally exercised by trustees (or administrators)， and， in a few 
instances， by creditors' committees. 
The administrative s仕uc制re 企om the 1993 Vietnamese 
Bankruptcy Law carried over into the 2002 Draft Vietnamese Bankruptcy 
Law. Section 59 ofthe 2002 draft modified old Section 18.1 ofthe 1993 
law and provided that as of the date the court issues the decision to handle 
the petition for settlement in bankruptcy， the power to manage the 
indebted merchant's assets would vest in the asset management team. 
Section 16 of the 2002 dra食modifiedold Section 17. The basic s住ucture
of the asset management c 
126 See VIETNAMESE 8ANKRUPTCY LAW RESEARCH REpORT， supra note 4， atPart Two， I， 1.1.1 
祖 ddiscussion in j，け'aP副 IV.
121 This office is based in the executive branch， not the judicial branch， VIETNAMESE BANKRUPTCY 
LAW RESEARCH REpORT， supra note 4， at Part One， II， 1.7 (“Execution of血eenterprise 
b_~ptcy decision is血ejobof血eexecutive branch") 
128Id at PaEt om，IIL l.6(“Asset ma且agementof debt burden enterprise is carried out by a 
col1ective or committee consisting ofmembers representing different interests"). 
129 Id.; see a/so 1993 Vie紅lameseBankruptcy Law 9 18. 
130 
1993 Vietnamese 8創立ruptcyLaw 9 42， 44. 
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composition changed somewhat企omthat set out in Article 17 of 
Vietnamese Decree 189. The asset management team was to consist of 
the following: court staf; the bailiff of the Judgment Execution Office or 
Judgment Execution Group; up to three creditors' representatives 131 
(although it appears企omSection 75.1.c of the 2002 Dra食 Vietnamese
Bankruptcy Law that both the court and the creditors each were to choose 
three representatives and that in the case of a conflict the court was 
empowered to override the creditors' choice and appoint its own 
representatives); a labor union representative or an employee's 
representative if there was no labor union; and officials of financial， 
banking and other professional offices. The head of the asset 
management team was to be a member of the court' s staf.132 Section 16 
empowered the asset management team to do the following: 
a) make the list of al of the assets of the indebted merchant; 
b) supervise and examine the management of assets by the 
merchant (including when necessary， the power to request 
the judge to issue provisional measures to preserve the 
remaining estate of the merchant); 
c) compile the list of creditors and debts that should be paid 
to each creditor; and 
d) enforce the judge's decisions during bankrupt settlement. 
The modified debtor-in-possession approach 企omold Section 
18.1 ofthe 1993 Vietnamese Bankruptcy Law was retained in Section 59 
of the 2002 Draft Vietnamese Bankruptcy Law. Section 59 provided that 
the indebted merchant would ordinarily conduct its business activities 
subject to the supervision and monitoring by the judge and the asset 
management team. In a change合omthe 1993 law， it also provided白at
the indebted merchant's assets would vest in the asset management team. 
Section 17.3 of the 2002 draft provided that the asset liquidation 
team was to consist of bailiffs and officials of the judgment execution 
office or judgment execution group; representatives of fmancial and 
banking offices at the corresponding level; a creditor's representative;133 a 
labor union representative or employees' representative where a labor 
union does not exist; and a representative of the indebted merchant. 
Pursuant to Section 17.1 of the 2002 Draft Vietnamese Bankruptcy Law， 
the enforcement of the. liquidation decision over the indebted merchant 
was under the power of the Judgment Enforcement Office or Judgment 
Enforcement Group where the main merchant' s address as prescribed in 
the merchant' s business certificate was located. The asset liquidation 
131 This isspecified in 2002 Draft Vietnamese Bankruptcy Law ~ 75J.c. 
132/d. IS 16.1 
133 However， incon.回 5tto血ecreditors' represen凶 veon the asset management team， it is not 
specified how the representative is appointed and whether there can be more than one. 
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team was given the following powers and duties pursuant to Section 19 of 
the 2002 Vietnamese Draft Bankruptcy Law (a revised version of old 
Section 44 ofthe 1993 Vietnamese Bankruptcy Law): 
1) to receive assets and the relevant documents transferred to 
it by the asset management team; 
2) to recover and manage al of the assets， documents， 
accounting books and seal of the merchant who was 
dec1ared bankrupt; 
3) to discover the indebted merchant's assets and request the 
head of the asset management team to recover them or the 
value of the assets or the difference in the value of the 
assets that were sold or仕 組sfe汀edillegally in accordance 
with Section 20 (pursuant to the exercise of avoidance 
powers). The asset liquidation team shall recover the 
assets， the value of the assets， or the difference under the 
decision of the head of the asset liquidation team; 
4) Based on the decision of the head of the asset liquidation 
team， toorganize an auction of the indebted merchant's 
assets; 
5) To deposit al money received of the merchant who is 
declared bankrupt into newly opened bank accounts; and 
6) To implement the liquidation in accordance with the 
decision of the judge. 
The 2004 Vietnamese Bankruptcy Law， pursuant to Article 9， 
merged the asset management and liquidation teams into one committee 
called the “trustee committee." The judge is to establish this committee at 
the time he makes the decision to commence bankruptcy proceedings. 
The members of the trustee committee are to include an officer of the 
court， an enforcement officer of the Judgment Execution Office of the 
same level (who is to act as Chairman ofthe Committee); a represen倒的
of the creditor (not necessarily the largest); ¥34 a representative of the 
debtor; and， as necessぽy，a representative of the trade union; a labor 
representative; and representatives of the relevant professional agencies. 
The basic structure is the same but there have been some important 
changes. First， an officer of the court no longer chairs the committee. 
Rather， that白nctionis exercised by an officer from the judgment 
enforcement body， which is pa託 ofthe executive branch. Second， the 
mandatory membership of the committee has been decreased and 
representatives 企om various govemmental dep紅 白lents no longer 
automatically serve on the committee. 
134 Pursuant to Article 64 ofthe 2004 Vietnamese Bankruptcy Law， it appe紅 S白紙 thereis only one 
creditor's represen回tiveon也ecommittee and血atthe creditors are able to vo旬 onthe replacement. 
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The duties and powers of this unified committee combine the 
duties and powers of批 twoprevious teams under the 2002 Dr拍
Vietnamese Bankruptcy Law， with only two main changes: (1) the 
implementation of a plan of asset dis住ibutionas may be directed by the 
judge has been added to the list， and (2) and in some of the duties and 
powers， the reference to the head of the asset management team or the 
asset liquidation team has been changed to the judge. Lastly， under the 
2004 Vie回ameseBankruptcy Law， as under the 2002 Draft Vietnamese 
Bankruptcy Law， the judge in charge of the bankruptcy proceedings 
chairs the meeting of creditors. I35 
Pursuant to Article 30 of the 2004 Vietnamese Bankruptcy Law， 
the modified debtor-in-possession approach continues subject to白e
supervision and inspection by the judge and the位usteecommittee， 
although the vesting language仕omthe 2002 draft has been deleted. 
However， an important innovation of the 2004 law is that Article 30.2 
provides that where it is considered白atthe manager of the enterprise of 
cooperative is incapable of operating the business， or his operation does 
not benefit血epreservation of the assets of the enterprise or cooperative， 
由ejudge， upon request from the creditors， shall make a decision to 
appoint a person to manage and operate the business activities or the 
enterprise or cooperative. This “manager" would be subject to the 
supervision and inspection by the judge and the trustee committee. 
It is a positive development that the head of the trustee committee 
is no longer a member of the court's staff and that government 
departments are no longer automatically on the committee， but this 
committee lacks the professional expertise and independence that the 
adminis位atorwill bring to the Chinese proceedings. The Vie回amese
acknowledge that one of the reasons for adopting a modified debtor-in-
possession approach is that the trustee committee does not have the 
necessary knowledge to manage the assets and run the enterprise at the 
same time. 136 It will be interesting to see if the manager position proves 
甜 ractiveto creditors and if the manager “exception" in Article 30.2 
becomes the norm and eventually replaces the modified debtor-in-
possession approach. If the manager position were utilized in practice， it 
would be helpful for the Vietnamese courts to follow the Chinese 
example and appoint independent insolvency professionals. Well-
qua1ified， experienced managers w 
日5See 2004 Vietn釘neseBankruptcy Law art. 61.4; 2002 Draft Vietnamese Bankruptcy Law art. 72. 
In con回 5t，it is proposed under bo自由e2002 and Octob巴r2004 Dra貧ChineseBankruptcy Laws 
由ata creditor will chair the rneetings. See October 2004 Draft Chin巴seBankruptcy Law art. 22. 
136 VIETNAMESE BANKRUPTCY LAW RESEARCH REPORT，supra note 4， atPart One， Il， 1.6 (“Asset 
rnanagernent of debt burden enterprise is carried out by a collective or cornrnittee consisting of 
rnernbers represen自宅 differentinterests"). 
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Creditors are involved in the process through representation on 
the trustee committee and participation in the creditors' meetings， but this 
involvement will not provide as much oversight and supervision as the 
creditors' committee is intended to do in China. Vietnam would be well 
advised to separate the functions and membership of the trustee 
committee and create a distinct creditors' committee. 
The judge in Vietnam has historically played the “central and 
decisive" role 137 in bankruptcy proceedings -from appointing the 
members of the trustee committee to chairing the creditors' meeting. It 
has been argued that this has been “suited to the social-economic and 
cultural situation" of Vie回am.138 However， at this stage in the 
development ofthe Vietnamese bankruptcy law， it would be better for the 
judge to play a less central role， or， ata minimum， torelinquish some of 
the administrative functions such as chairing the creditors' meeting. 1t is 
a positive change that court staff no longer chairs the甘usteecommittee， 
but it would be even better if an officer of the court did not even serve on 
the committee. ln contrast to the checks and balances that have been built 
into the proposed Chinese law， the Vietnamese procedure stil lacks 
independent functionaries and阻 ad何回tesupervisory structure. 
V. CORPORATE REHABILITATION 
Corporate reorganization is possible under both the 1986 Chinese 
Bankruptcy Law and the PRC Civil Procedure Law， but the number of 
cases IS veη10W.139 The situation was si町山runder the 1993 Vietnamese 
Bankruptcy Law.140 A major impetus for the enac加lentof new insolvency 
laws in both China and Vie伯amwas to put in place more user-仕iendly
co中oraterescue procedures. 
China 
Existing Chinese bankruptcy law provides for co甲oraterescue， 
but there are very few provisions. Part 4 of the 2002 Supreme People's 
Court Provisions (Artic1es 25-30) and Part IV of the 1986 Chinese 
Bankruptcy Law (Artic1es 17-22) inc1ude provisions regarding 
conciliation (also called reconciliation， mediation， settlement， 
composition， or compromise) and reorganization. The PRC Civil 
Procedure Law also includes one provision on conciliation (Artic1e 202). 
The laws also include separate provisions on approval by the creditors. In 
137 ld. at Part One， II， 1.5 (“ηle Court一白eωntraJsu句ect，playing a decisive role in the 
b31水ruptcyproceeding in Vietn加担")
138 Id 
139 See W311g， supra no旬 11，at 220 (the number of cases invoking白ereorg副首zationprovisions in 
the law was ciose to zero). 
140Id. 
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cases involving both SOEs and non-SOEs， after the court accepts the case 
and before the case is concluded， the debtor may apply to the court for 
conciliation. Altematively， the People's Court itself， in the co町田 of
trying the bankruptcy case， may propose a settlement to the parties.141 The 
creditors may not commence the conciliation process. If the debtor and 
creditors reach a settlement agreement (e.g.， to reduce the amount to be 
paid to the creditors) and the People's Court approves the agreement 
before a declaration of bankruptcy has been made， the bankruptcy 
procedure is stayed.142 If agreement among the debtor and creditors and 
the approval of the People's Court occurs after the declaration of 
bankruptcy， the People's Court shall s匂y the enforcement of the 
bankruptcy dec1aration ruling and stay the bankruptcy procedure.143 If the 
debtor later fails to discharge al of its debts in accordance with the 
settlement agreement， the creditors may apply to the People' s Court for 
enforcement.l44 If the debtor fails or is unable to perform the settlement， 
the creditors may apply to the People's Court to resume the bankruptcy 
procedure. ln addition， incases where the settlement was reached prior to 
the declaration of bankruptcy， the People's Court shall simu1taneously 
rule to declare the d白eb刷tωOぽrbankrupt when ruling to resume the bankruptcy 
p戸ro∞cedu町re.ピ145
Reorganization is a more formal process that may only be used 
for SOEs and only in cases in which a creditor filed the bankruptcy 
petition. Where the SOE has a superior depar加lentin charge， only the 
government dep紅白lentmay apply for reorganization and must file the 
application within three months of the date the People' s Court accepts the 
bankruptcy case and before the People's Court makes the bankruptcy 
dec1aration. 146 Where the SOE does not have a superior department in 
charge， the SOE's shareholders' meeting may pass a resolution and apply 
for reorganization and persons designated by the shareholders' meeting 
shall undertake the reorganization.147 Pursuant to Article 18 of the 1986 
PRC Bankruptcy Law， the reorganization of an SOE always involves 
conciliation; after the application for reorganization is made， the SOE is 
required to submit a conci1iation agreement to the creditors' meeting. 
141 2002 Supreme People's Court Provisions副 25 廿rrough凶 eof the words qi ye (企¥jJ[)
[ente中rise]，Artic1e 25 of山 2002Supreme People's Court Provisions would app叩 toapply to 
both SOEs and non-SOEs. This would extend由euse of conciliation to SOEs in cases not invo!ving 
reorganization. Artic1es 17組 d18 of the 1986 Chinese Bankruptcy Law on1y discuss conci!iation 
in the context of the reorganization of SOEs -Article 18 states that白eenterprise must submit a 
dra貸 conciliationagreement to the creditors' mee也19a貧eran application for reorganization has 
been presented. See infra notes 146-157 and accompanying text. The 1986 law is silent on the issue 
ofwh抽 erconciliation can app!y to an SOE in a case not involving a reorganization 
山 2002Supreme Peop!e's Court Provisions art. 25 
143Id. 
1制 ld.art. 26 
1451d. art. 27. 
1461986 Chinese Bankruptcy Law art. 17; 2002 Supreme People's Court Provisions art. 28. The 
P.t:riod for reorganization may not cxceed two years. 1986 Chinese Bankruptcy Law飢 17.
山 2002Supreme Peop!e's Court Provisions art. 28. 
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During the reorganization， the superior departrnent in charge or the 
designated persons， as the case may be， shall periodically report on the 
reorganization and the implementation of the settlement agreement to the 
creditors' meeting and the People's Court.148 During the reorganization， 
any enforcement against the debtors' property continues to be stayed 
pursuant to Article 1 of the 1986 Chinese Bar虫ruptcyLaw. Pursuant to 
Article 13 of the 1986 Chinese Bankruptcy Law， secured creditors do not 
vote at the creditors' meeting and thus act outside the reorganization 
process. 
Articles 33 and 34 of the 1991 Supreme People' s Court Opinion 
help clari命 thedifferences between conciliation and reorganization. 
Article 34 provides that where an application for reorganization is made， 
the draft conciliation agreement submitted to the creditors must set out 
sources of capital for debt repa戸nent，a method of debt repayment， and 
the term of the debt repayment. ln con仕ast，pursuant to Article 33， the 
reorganization plan must include the following: analysis ofthe reasons for 
the enterprise having reached the edge of insolvency; a plan for the 
a司JUs出lentor establishrnent of a new management group for the 
enterprise; feasibility-concerning measures and reforms to be taken for 
the improvement of business management and measures to be taken for 
changes in production; methods of reducing losses and increasing profits; 
and the term and objectives of the reorganization (not to exceed two 
years). Article 34 also provides that where an enterprise being 
reorganized requires a reduction of debt， the application shall clearly state 
the arnount of the reduction required. From these articles， it can be seen 
由at“[t]heconciliation will focus only on the relationship between a 
debtor and [its] creditors regarding [the] payment scheme while the 
reorganization wi1l focus on how to出lprovethe economic situation of the 
debtor in the印刷re.，149
The insolvency reform process in China has emphasized the 
importance of co中oraterescue. Chapter Vl of the 2002 draft applied to 
reorganization and Chapter VII to conciliation. To highlight their 
importance， they appeared before the liquidation chapter， Chapter VIII. 
In the October 2004 draft， these chapters have been renumbered as 
follows: Reorganization， Chapter VII; Conciliation， Chapter VIII; and 
Bankruptcy Liquidations， Chapter IX. 
Debtors will be able to choose whether to file for reor 
::M副 29.See a/.削蜘C凶 eseB凶 uptcyLaw山山8
See Yu & Gu， supra note 17. 
IlO October 2004 Drnft Chinese Bankruptcy Law art. 9. 
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sole proprietors. However， with the October 2004 Draft Bankruptcy Law 
now limited to legal person enterprises， this distinction is no longer 
relevant. The simpler conciliation procedure might appeal to smaller 
enterprises or to less complicated cases in which the debtor is confident 
that an agreement can be reached quickly. 
Under the October 2004 draft， the commencement of a 
reorganization will no longer also凶ggera formal conciliation proced町 e.
However， aswill be seen in the discussion below， the reorganization plan 
incorporates the factors that are included in the conciliation agreement 
under the 1986 Chinese Bankruptcy Law. 
Chapter VII dramatically broadens the scope of debtors that may 
use reorganization， as well as the range of parties that may petition for the 
procedure. No longer will reorganization be a procedure limited to SOEs 
to be used at the discretion of the government (or the shareholders in the 
absence of a superior department in charge). All legal person enterprises， 
both SOEs and non-SOES， will be able to utilize the procedure.151 The 
October 2004 draft does not require the petitioner to speciかtherelief 
sought at the time of petitioning， and， where relief is not requested， 
certain parties are permitted to make a request a食erthe court accepts the 
case， but before the declaration of bankruptcy. Article 9 of the October 
2004 Draft Chinese Bankruptcy Lawl52 provides that either the debtor or 
the creditors may file a petition. A debtor may file an application for 
bankruptcy with the People's Court if (1) the debtor is unable to pay its 
debts when due， and (2) the debtor's assets cannot pay al of its liabilities 
or obviously lack the ability to pay them.153 The balance sheet test in the 
second prong of this clause unfortunately inserts some uncertainty into 
the process. In con仕ast，a creditor may file a petition relying on the 
debtor' s inabi1ty to pay its debts when due.154 Article 65 of the October 
2004 draftl55 provides that either the debtor or the creditors may apply for 
reorganization at the time of petitioning or after the court accepts the 
case， but before the court declares the debtor bankrupt. Although 
shareholders are not permitted under the draft Chinese law to file a 
petition， Article 65 permits them to apply for reorganization a食erthe 
court accepts the case， but prior to the declaration ofbankruptcy， so long 
as more than one-tenth (one-third in Article 66 of the 2002 draft) of the 
sharehol 
151 ld. art. 2; 2002 Draft Chinese Bankruptcy Law arts. 65， 66. 
152 2002 Draft Chinese Bankruptcy Lawart. 11. 
15l October 2004 Draft Chinese Bankruptcy Law arts. 2， 9.Tbe balance sheet test did not appear in 
也e2002 Dra食ChineseBankruptcy Law. See 2002 Draft Chinese Ba且訂uptcyLaw art. 4 (cash flow 
test for both a debtor's and creditors' petitions) 
154 October 2004 Draft Chinese Bankruptcy Law art. 9. 
155 ld. art. 66. 
1561d. art. 95. 
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of petitioning or after acceptance， but prior to the declaration of the 
bankruptcy case. Creditors may not apply for conciliation. 
The period企omwhen the People's Court decides to reorganize 
the debtor to the date that the court approves the reorganization plan or 
terminates the reorganization procedure is called the protective period of 
reorganization. 157 As a general rule， during the protective period of 
reorganization， the administrator shall perform the duties and powers 
prescribed in Article 23 of the October 2004 Draft Chinese Bankruptcy 
Law158 and may employ staff to manage the business operations of the 
ente中riseor ask the debtor to take on management responsibilities.159 
However， a major change included in the new ArtiGle 69 of the October 
2004 dra食 providesthat in a case in which the debtor files a petition， at
the time of the filing the debtor is allowed to request permission to 
manage the assets and continue the running of the business. Subject to the 
approval of the People's Court， the debtor may thus be allowed to carry 
on under what is basically a modified debtor-in-possession approach. 
Where the debtor opts to retain control， ifan administrator has already 
been appointed the adminis甘ator，she must retum possession to the 
debtor. In such cases， the adminis仕ator'srole becomes one of 
supervising the debtor.160 
The initial period of protection may not exceed six months， but 
upon request of the administrator (or the debtor， as the case may be) and 
with the agreement ofthe creditors， the People's Co町 tmay approve the 
extension of the protective period for up to an another three months.161 
During the protective period， secured creditors are stayed企omseeking 
repossession of their collateral， but they are allowed to seek exemption 
世omthe stay in cases in which their collateral may be darnaged or its 
value decreased dramatical1y.162 
During the protective period， toassist the debtor in continuing its 
business operation， the debtor is permitted to borrow money; moreover， 
subject to res住icteduse and necessary controls， the debtor is even 
permitted to grant lenders during the protective period security interests in 
property not yet collateralized.163 In other words， during this period， the 
debtor is able to seek what is often cal1ed “'post-petition" financing on 
157 October 2004 Draft Chinese Bankruptcy Law art. 68; 202 D飽食 Chinese Bankruptcy Law art. 
68. 
158 202 Draft Chinese B拙 ruptcyLaw制 29.
， October 2004 Draft Chinese Bankruptcy Law arts. 26， 70; compare with 2002 Dra食 Chinese
h 歯 uptcyLaw (including a provision on凶 ngstaf [art. 70] but no provision on asking debtor to 
叫ceon management responsibilities). 
i凹 ld.art. 69 
1611d.飢 77;compare w帥 2002Draft Chinese B組 h刷cyLaw副.68 (six montbs). 
山 October2004 Draft Chinese Bankruptcy Law art. 71; 2002 Draft Chinese Bankruptcy Law art. 
71. Secured creditors are not bound by tbe stay in bankruptcy or conciliation. See October 2004 
q~ft Chinese Bankruptcy Law art. 71; 2002 Draft Chinese Bankruptcy Law arts. 19・121.
1630ctobEr2004Dma cMIlese Banuuptcy Law art.72，2002DmR CMESE Banullptcy Law art. 
72. 
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tenns that allows the lender to leap合ogover existing unsecured creditors. 
There is a variety of other provisions applicable during the protective 
period regarding other matters including allowing owners to rec1aim 
property in the possession of the debtorl64 and providing for the rejection 
or acceptance of executory contracts. 165 Artic1e 77 of the 2004 draft 
provides that if the reorganization procedure is tenninated for cause 
during the protective period， the People's Court is required to make a 
ruling dec1aring the debtor bankrupt. 100 
Section 3 of Chapter VII pertains to the reorganization plan. The 
adminis仕ator (or debtor) is responsible for drafting the plan of 
reorganization.167 Artic1e 79 of the October 2004168 draft provides that the 
plan must contain the following: 
(1) the management scheme ofthe reorganized enterprise; 
(2) the classification of the debts; 
(3) the adjustment scheme ofthe debts; 
(4) the repayment scheme of the debts; 
(5) the executing time limits ofthe reorganization plan; and 
(6) the supervising time limits ofthe reorganization plan; and 
(7) other schemes that are conducive to the reorganization of 
the ente叩rise.
Debts in the plan are c1assified in one of fo町 categories:secured 
debts; workers' wages; tax debts; or ordinary unsecured debts.169 The 
administrator (or debtor) is required to submit the plan of reorganization 
to the People's Court creditors' meeting within six months， but may seek 
an extension for up to three months.170 After the People's Court receives 
the draft plan of reorganization， if after如 examinationthe plan is 
deemed to meet the requirements of the new bankruptcy law， the court 
shall convene the creditors' meeting to vote on the plan， and at the 
meeting the administrator (or debtor) shall make explanations about the 
draft plan to the creditors' meeting and answer questions.l71 
164 October 2004 Dra食ChineseBankruptcy Law art. 73; 2002 Draft Chinese Bankruptcy Law art. 
73 
165 October 2004 Draft Chinese Bankruptcy Law art. 74; 2002 Draft Chinese Bankruptcy Law art. 
75. 
166 See also 2002 Draft Chin悶 BankruptcyLaw art. 77. 
叩， October 2004 Draft Chinese Bankruptcy Law art 78; 2002 Draft Chinese Bankruptcy Law art. 
78. 
168 Compare with 2002 Draft Chinese Bankruptcy Law art. 79 (2004命aftadds additional facωr (6) 
姐 ddeletes a factor referring to the ex.ecutor of the reorganization). 
169 October 2004町aftChinese Bankruptcy Law眠 80;2002 Dra食ChineseBankruptcy Law art. 
80. 
170 October 2004 Dra食 ChineseBankruptcy Law art. 77; compare with 2002 Draft Chinese 
雪印kruptcyLaw副 .81(pl釦 mustbe submitted to court within period set by People's Court). 
'" October 2004 Dr百貨 ChineseBankruptcy Law art. 81; 2002 Draft Chinese Bankruptcy Law art 
82. 
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The creditors shall vote on the plan in the four groups noted 
above. Approval requires a majority in number of the creditors in each 
group present at the meeting and more than two-thirds of the se凶ed
amount of the debts of the groUp.172 The debtors' shareholders are also 
allowed to attend the creditors' meeting， but only as non-voting 
delegates. I 日 The plan is deemed to be adopted where al of the groups 
pass the plan.174 
Article 85 of the October 2004 Draf王ChineseBankruptcy Law175 
applies in those si旬ationswhere any of the groups do not approve the 
plan. At first instance， the administrator (or the debtor) is empowered to 
negotiate with each group that has rejected the plan and allow the group 
to vote again after concluding negotiation. Ifthe plan is stil not accepted 
after the second vote， the administrator (or the debtor) may then apply to 
the court for approval of the plan over the objection of the group(s) that 
voted against the plan based on the application of further criteria 
(including a limited “cramdown" power). Where the creditors have not 
approved the plan on the second vote after the negotiation with the 
administrator (or the debtor as the case may be) the People's Court shall 
declare the debtor bankrupt.176 
Where the four groups have adopted the reorganization plan， the 
administrator has ten days in which to apply to the People's Court for its 
approval of the plan.177 Upon receipt of the application， the People's 
Court must decide whether to approve the plan within 30 days after 
examining it and determining if it satisfies the procedures prescribed in 
the new bankruptcy law.178 
When the plan is approved by the court， it is binding over al 
debts that were established before the People's Court accepted the 
bankruptcy case.179 The debtor is responsible for the performance of the 
reorganization plan， subject to supervision by the administrator.180 Where 
I72 October 2004 Draft Chinese Bankruptcy Law art. 83; 2002 Dra貧ChineseBankruptcy Law art 
84 
173 October 2004 Dra仕ChineseBankruptcy Law art. 82; 2002 Draft Chinese Bankruptcy Law art. 
83 
174 October 2004 Draft Chinese Bankruptcy Law art. 84; 2002 Draft Chinese Bankruptcy Law art. 
84. 
1 ~5 See also 2002 Draft Chinese Bankruptcy Law art. 85 
176 October 2004 Dra宜 ChineseBankruptcy Law art. 86 (where the plan is not approved); cornpare 
with 2002 Draft Chinese Bankruptcy Law art. 86 (also includes where the plan has not been 
subm削ed).
且" October 2004 Draft Chinese Bankruptcy Law art. 84; 2002 Draft Chinese Bankruptcy Law art. 
87. 
1780ctober 2004 Draft Chinese Bankruptcy Law art. 84; 2002 Draft Chinese Bankruptcy Law art. 
87. 
179 October 2004 Draft Chinese Bankruptcy Law art. 90; 2002 Draft Chinese Bankruptcy Law art. 
91. 
80 October 2004 Draft Chinese Bankruptcy Law arts. 87， 89. In the 2002 Draft Chincse Bankruptcy 
Law， a pl組 executorwas to be appointed to c紅ryout this function and the adminis回 torwas 
permitted to become the plan executor. 2002 Draft Chinese Bankruptcy Law art. 90. 
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the reorganized enterprise is unable or fails to caπY out the reorganization 
plan， the People's Court shall terminate the execution of the 
reorganization and declare the debtor bankrupt.181 When this occurs， the 
creditors may claim in the debtor's bankruptcy for the total of any unpaid 
amounts under the plan.182 
This new reorganization procedure is a major improvement over 
current law. It includes the broad variety of provisions that are found in 
other modem co甲oraterescue laws such as U.S. Chapter 1， although in 
many places the proposed provisions would benefit企omgreater detail. 
Providing the debtor with the choice between having an adminis汀atoror 
retaining control might well prove to be one of the proposed law's 
strengths， a1though more thought should be given to situations in which 
the creditors would prefer to have an administrator appointed. Even 
where the debtor retains control， the administrator wil1 continue in a 
supervisory role and， with the adminis汀ation'sinsolvency experience， 
will con甘ibutegreat1y to the co甲oraterescue process. However， it is 
curious that the Chinese have decided to include a balance sheet test for 
debtors' petitions， as such a requirement will create unnecessary obstacles 
to commencing the co中oraterescue process. 
Vietnam 
The rehabilitation process under the 1993 Vietnamese Bankruptcy 
Law was very different企omthe current Chinese procedures. The 1993 
Vietnamese law mandated the use of co中oraterescue procedures before 
an enterprise could be declared bankrupt. Although these co叩orate
rescue efforts were required both before and after a bankruptcy petition 
was filed，183 the reality was that petitions were normally commenced for 
the pu中oseof liquidation rather than rescue. 184 How was it that these 
mandated procedures proved so ineffective? The problem under the old 
regime revolved around Section 2 ofthe 19931aw: 
A bankrupt ente甲山emeans an enterprise that stil faces 
financial difficulties or stil suffers losses in its operations 
after it has applied al necessary financial measures and as a 
result， loses its ability to repay debts when they fal due. 
Article 3 the Vie位lameseDecree No. 189 added the following detail: 
181 October 2004 Dra食ChineseBankruptcy Law art. 91. 
182 ld. art. 92. 
183 In adition， vo1untary conciliation was penited in the period after the petition was釦edand 
before the court decided whether to make a bankruptcy order. 193 Vietnamese Bankruptcy Law ~ 
6. 
184 VIETNAMESE BANKRUPTCY LA W RESEARCH REPORT， supra note 4， at Part Two， I， 1.1.1. 
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1. A business is deemed to have shown signs of falling into a 
bankrupt situation defined at Section 2 of the [1993 
Vietnamese Bankruptcy Law] when it has taken losses for 
two consecutive years to the point that it is no longer 
capable of repaying the due debts and of giving ful pay to 
its laborers under the labor agreement for three 
consecutive months. 
2. When signs of a bankrupt si旬ationappear as defined in 
Item 1 of this Artic1e， the business shall have to take 
fmancial measures to overcome insolvency. These 
inc1ude: 
a) To adopt a program to reorganize production and 
business， exert tight controls of expenditures， and find 
out1ets for its products; 
b) To take measures to handle commodities， products， 
and materials in stock; 
c) To recover misappropriated loans and properties; 
d) To negotiate with creditors to delay payment of debts， 
to assure loan transfers or guarantees， and to reduce or 
write off debts; and 
e) To seek sources of funding and loans to pay the due 
debts and to invest in technological renewa1. 
3. After having taken the necessaηfinancial measures 
mentioned in Item 2 of the Artic1e， ifthe business is sti1l 
not out of difficulties and cannot overcome insolvency 
then it has fal1en into a bankrupt situation and must be 
dealt with as prescribed by the [1993 Vietnamese 
Bankruptcy Law] and this Decree. 
133 
Thus， before an enterprise could even be eligible for bankruptcy 
relief， it already had to have exbausted “al financial measures" including 
out-of-court rescue and negotiation s回 tegiesto address financial losses 
over a consecutive two-year period. This policy was open to 
manipulation by ente甲 山esthat wished to avoid bankruptcy: they would 
conceal the fact that they were bankrupt and delay the filing of the 
petition. 185 It also created a two-ye釘 moratoriumon the ability of 
creditors to push recalcitrant enterprises into bankruptcy. The delays 
were even longer in many cases， leading to si同ationswhere there were 
few remaining assets when the bankruptcy was eventually dec1ared. JdO At 
1851d. at Part Two， I， 1.2.1 
186 See， e.g.， the discussion of the case of the SOE Quang Nam Da Nang Meat Export Company in 
id. at P訂 tTwo， I， 3.1.1 (“Dealing with insolvent enterprises by bankruptcy proceedings"). 
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times， there was not even enough to cover the costs of the bankruptcy 
~___ 187 
res. 
The situation was exacerbated by the COurtS' application of the 
relevant provisions in the 1993 Vietnamese Bankruptcy Law once a 
petition was tiled. After a bankruptcy petition was filed， the court， 
p町 suantto Sections 13 and 15 ofthe 1993 Vietnamese Bankruptcy Law， 
was required to detennine whether the case should be dismissed or the 
court should proceed with the petition. This decision required an 
application of Section 2. It was not uncommon for enterprises to be given 
the opportunity to implement necessary tinancial measures.188 In many 
other cases， petitions were rejected “merely due to the failure by the 
applicant to comply with the required fonnalities， such as insufticient 
accounting books， records and documents necessary for detennining 
losses or tinancial difficulties， or lack of accounting certitication.，189 Yet 
other applications were dismissed because the ente中rise'slosses resulted 
from i1legal or企audulentactivity and therefore the enterprise was not 
eligible to use the bankruptcy procedures.190 
Section 6 of the 1993 VieむlameseBankruptcy Law provided that 
“voluntary conciliation" could be attempted between the creditors and the 
debtors after the ti1ing of the petition and before the judge decided 
whether to proceed with the petition. Moreover， pursuant to Section 20 of 
the 1993 Vietnamese Bankruptcy Law， after the court issued the decision 
to proceed with the bankruptcy case， the court then initiated the 
mandatory co中oraterescue process.191 This has been identified as a 
“unique" feature of the old Vietnamese bankruptcy law.192 The court 
would request the owner or legal representative of the enterprise to 
prep訂 e a conciliation proposal and restructuring solutions for 
restructuring the operations of the enterprise. The time limit for 
completing the restructuring would be set by the creditors' meetings， but 
in any case could not exceed two years仕omthe date the creditors agreed 
on the conciliation proposal. The conci1iation measures and restructuring 
solutions had to include detai1ed tenns and a plan of implementation for 
the measures to reorganize the business and to reduce and repay debt.193 
The parties had only 60 days企omthe date of the judge's request to 
forward the judge the conciliation proposal and restructuring solutions. 
Where this deadline was not complied with， the judge would e 
187Id. at Part Two， 1I， 1.1.1. There were no cases in which debt recovery exceeded 30% of the 
debts.ld. at Part Two， I1， 3.1.1. 
188 Id. at Part Two， I， 3.1.1. 
189Id. at Part Two， 1， 2.3. 
190 Id. at Part One， II， 2.1 
191 For a detailed discussion of血.eprocess under Section 20 of the 1993 Vietnamese Bankruptcy 
Law， see id. at Part One， II， 2.4.e. 
192Id. atPart One， I1 5.2.3; Part Two， I， 1 1.1. 
193 Vietnamese Govemment Decree No. 189 art. 13. 
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the judge was required to convene a meeting of creditors， which he would 
chair.IY'I At the meeting， the creditors would decide whether to approve 
the conciliation proposal and restructuring solutions. Approval required a 
majority in number and at least two-thirds of the to凶1amount of the 
unsecured debts present at the meeting. 195 The judge would then 
temporarily suspend the bankruptcy proceedings and the owner or the 
legal representative of the enterprise would be responsible for 
implementing the plan.196 Only if the process failed at any of the various 
stages could a declaration of bankruptcy be made and a liquidation of the 
enterprises' assets commence.197 Liquidation was the norm. 
A comparison of the corporate rescue provisions in Chapter VI， 
Section 1 of the 2004 Vietnamese Bankruptcy Law (and Part I， Chapter 
VI of the 2002 Draft Vietnamese Bankruptcy Law) with the 1993 
Vietnamese Bankruptcy Law yields one major change -old Section 2 of 
the 1993 Vietnamese Bankruptcy Law has been omitted and replaced 
with a simple cash flow test for determining whether the enterprise is in a 
bankrupt situation.198 This one change should have a significant effect on 
co叩oraterescue because， as can be seen from the discussion above， the 
application of old Section 2 made it almost impossible to rehabilitate an 
ente甲riseunder Vietnamese ban1σuptcy law. 
There are also some very important similarities between the 2004 
law (and the 2002 draft) with the 1993 law -most importantly， the 
retention of the modified debtor-in-possession approach in which the 
加 steecommittee (asset management team in the 2002 draft) and the 
judge supervise白edebtor. 19 The 2002 draft modified aspects of the 
procedure in the 1993 law， only to be amended in the 2004 Vieむlamese
Bank:ruptcy Law to a form， in some respects， closer to the original 1993 
law. Ofco町 se，with the deletion of old Section 2， the new procedure in 
the 2004 law will operate quite different1y. 
The 2002 Draft Vietnamese Bank:ruptcy Law required the 
petitioner to“c1early state whether it require[ d] the commencement of the 
rehabilitation procedure or the liquidation procedure."200 Section 13 ofthe 
2002 draft provided that where it was found that the merchant was in a 
bank:rupt si印刷on，the judge had the power to decide whether to proceed 
with bankruptcy or rehabilitation. Chapter V of Part I (Sections 78・84)
194 193 Vietnamese Bankruptcy Law art. 28. 
19S Id. art. 29. 
1同 Id.紅白.29，30
197 Id. art. 30 (也esection provides for six circumstances in which the court could make血e
declaration of bankruptcy)ー
1982004 Vietnamese Bankruptcy Law art. 3. For merchants under the 2002 Draft Vietnamese 
Ba且kruptcyLaw， see 9 6.9， 52.2. 
1992004VIemamese Bankruptcy Law art.30;2002Draaviemamese B紅水ruptcyLaw art. 59. 
Article 30 of the 2004 law provided for the appoin伽旭川 ofa manager in certain circumstances. See 
discusion in Part II of the Article. 
Z曲 2002Draft Vietnamese Bankruptcy Law art. 48.1. 
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required the judge to hold a住ialto determine the matter. At the meeting， 
the head of the asset management team would make a report on the 
indebted merchant' s fmancial situation， the merchant and creditors would 
have the right to present their opinions， and the merchant would have the 
oppo武田ityto suggest a solution to deal with the debts and business and 
produce a reorganization plan. The judge would then decide which 
procedure to pursue. Where the court opted for rehabilitation， the 
rehabilitation provisions in Chapter VI of Part Il (Sections 85 to 96) 
would apply and the merchant and creditors would have 15 days in which 
to negotiate and reach agreement on a merchant rehabilitation plan. 
Approval of the plan would require a majority of the secured creditors 
holding two-thirds of the total value of the secured debts of the creditors 
attending the meeting (unlike the 1993 law) and a majority of the 
unsecured creditors holding a majority ofthe value ofthe unsecured debts 
of the creditors attending the meeting. The agreed plan would then be 
confirmed by the court. 
In contrast， the 2004 Vie租ameseBankruptcy Law retums to the 
procedure in the 1993 law in which the petitioner is not allowed to choose 
between liquidation and rehabilitation， but rather files a bankruptcy 
petition.201 This change in the filing requirements leads to the second 
change， relating to the meeting of creditors. Since the petitioner is not 
able to choose between liquidation and rehabilitation， Article 64.1 
provides the creditors with that choice. At the first meeting of creditors， 
the following must occur: (1) the chairman ofthe加 steecommittee must 
report on a v紅白tyof matters inc1uding the financial status of the 
enterprise (or cooperative) at risk of bankruptcy， and the results of the 
asset inventory; (2) the owner or legal representative of the enterprise (or 
cooperative) must comment on the report made by the chairman of the 
trustee committee and propose solutions and plans to restruc加rethe 
enterprise's business operations and the possibility and term of debt 
repa戸nent.202 After the reports， the creditors must vote on a resolution to 
restructure the ente中riseor cooperative.203 For a resolution to pass it 
must get a majority of the unsecured creditors present at the meeting， so 
long as the attendees as a group represent at least two-thirds of the value 
of the unsecured debts.204 At the first meeting， the judge is also requested 
to appoint a person to man 
201 See 2004 Vietnamese B:u立ruptcyLaw arts. 13・18.
202 Id.副. 64. Lb. This information was put forth at出ejudicial triaI under也e2002 Draft 
Vietnamese B:u曲uptcyLaw. 
203 Id. art. 64. Ld. 
204 Id. 
20S Id. art. 64.l.e. Under the 2002 Draft Vietnamese Bankruptcy Law ~ 87，也.edebtor-in-possession 
stage continued until a plan was approved. When the creditors voted in favor of白erehabilitation 
HeinOnline -- 18 Colum. J. Asian L. 137 2004
2004] BANKRUPTCY LA WS IN SOCIALIST MARKET ECONOMIES 137 
Once the creditors pass such a resolution， the judge has the 
obligation to apply由eprocedures for the rehabilitation of the business.206 
It is at this stage that the business rehabilitation procedures under Chapter 
VI commence. Wi白in30 days of the creditor resolution in favor of 
business rehabilitation， the enterprise or cooperative is required to submit 
its business rehabilitation plan.207 If more time is needed， it may request 
the court to grant one extension for up to an additional 30 days戸8The 
right to submit the plan is not exclusive， and any creditor or person 
responsible for the business rehabilitation of the enterprise of cooperative 
is entitled to submit a dra食 plan.209Within 15 days of receiving the 
business rehabilitation plan， the court must either introduce the plan to白e
meeting of creditors for its consideration and decision， or make 
suggestions to amend and supplement the plan if it fails to comply with 
the plan requirements in Article 69.210 Artic1e 69 provides that the plan 
must specifシ“necessaIγmeasures"to assist with the recovery of the 
ente中山e'sbusiness operations， and set out the conditions， term， and 
schedules for the repayment of debts. The necessary measures may 
include proposals: 
a. to mobilize new capital so町 ces;
b. to change production and business goods of an ente中山町
c. to renew production technology; 
d. to restructure the ente甲rise's or the cooperative's 
management app町a印s and to merge or demerge 
production divisions to e曲 ance productivity and 
production q回 lity;
e. to re-sel1 new shares to creditors; 
f. to sel or lease unnecessary assets; and 
g. other measures not con佐aryto the law.2I1 
The court must convene the creditors' meeting within ten days of 
deciding to refer the plan to the creditors.212 At this stage， a further 
difference from the 2002 draft law arises. At the meeting of creditors， a 
plan is adopted where a majority of unsecured creditors holding at least 
two-thirds ofthe total unsecured debts vote in favor ofthe plan.213 Unlike 
plan， the asset management team would be dissolved組 dthe supervision of the merchant would be 
体enup by the 悶 ditOIS'represen凶 ves.
竺2004Vie位lameseBankruptcy Law art. 68.1. 
<v， Id. art. 68.2. 
208 ld. 
Z帥 ld.
210Id. art. 70. 
211 ld.副 69.2.
212 Id. art. 71.1. 
213 Id. art. 71.2. 
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the proposed 2002 draft， the 2004 law does not provide the secured 
creditors with the opportunity to vote on the plan. 
After creditors approve the plan， the judge shall adopt the 
resolution. As under the 2002 proposals， it is at this stage that仕le佐ustee
committee (asset management team under the 2002 draft) is dissolved and 
creditors become responsible for supervising the implementation of the 
plan.214 
The Vietnamese reorganization proced町 ewill benefit immensely 
合omthe deletion of the old Section 2 requirement. Rescues wi1l now be 
possible. However， unlike the Chinese model， the new Vietnamese law 
lacks a “driver" for the process. The professional administrator in China， 
whether running the ente甲山eday-to-day or supervising management， 
will almost certainly prove more effective than the trustee committee in 
Vietnam. 
Another party missing合omthe reorganization process is the 
secured creditor. Where a secured creditor has a lien or mortgage over 
assets necessary for carrying on the business of the enterprise of the 
cooperative， problems are very likely to arise since a secured creditor is 
entitled to have its debts se凶edby its mortgaged assets (pursuant to 
Artic1e 37 ofthe 2004 Vietnamese Bankruptcy Law). In practice， before 
attending the first meeting of creditors， the chairperson of the加 stee's
committee should meet with the secured creditor to get the creditor' s 
consent to release the asset for use in the reorganization. Where the 
trustee is unable to secure the consentJparticipation of the secured 
creditor( s)， the secured creditor( s) in essence will have veto power over 
the process. 
VI. PRIORITIES IN DISTRIBUTION AND THE PROTECTION 
OF EMPLOYEES' INTERESTS 
Asset distribution to creditors in bankruptcies in China and 
Vietnam historically has been complicated by the need to protect the 
workers of insolvent SOEs. This special protection has been necessary in 
the absence of well-developed social security systems. 
China 
Pursuant to Artic1e 32 of the 1986 Chinese Insolvency Law， 
secured creditors enjoy a right of priority over unsecured creditors to the 
extent of the level of their security. Article 37 of the 1986 Bankruptcy 
Law provides that after paying the expenses of the winding up， the order 
of priority among unsecured creditors is as fol1ows: 
214Id. arts. 72， 73. See supra note 205. 
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(1) employees' wages and labor insurance expenses owed by 
the insolvent enterprise; 
(2) taxes owed by the insolvent enterprise; and 
(3) insolvency c1aims (c1aims ofthe unsecured creditors). 
139 
Where there are insufficient assets to satis今alof the c1aims within the 
same ranking， Artic1e 37 provides for the assets to be dis仕ibutedpro rata 
within that ranking. Artic1es 56 to 58 ofthe 2002 PRC Supreme People's 
Court Provisions provide that the frst priority for worker's c1aims in 
Artic1e 37(1) above inc1udes severance pay owed to workers whose labor 
contracts are terminated due to the bankruptcy of the enterprise， labor 
compensation owed by the debtor to re郡larnon-staff and workers 
(including temporary workers)， and the pooled funds of the ente中rise's
staff and workers owed by the debtor， but not high interest thereon. 
From the legislation， itappears that the priority scheme in the 
1986 Chinese Bankruptcy Law adopts the traditional mode1. However， in
reality the practice is quite different for SOE insolvencies subject to the 
policy decrees that have provided workers' resettlement rights with a first 
c1aim on the land use rights of SOEs in priority to the preexisting rights of 
secured creditors.215 ln thousands of cases， these policy decrees have cut 
back on the traditional priority scheme in the 1986 Chinese Bankruptcy 
Law. ln other words， there appear to be two competing priority schemes 
in China. 
The 2002 draft retained the priority scheme of the 1986 law， with 
secured creditors getting paid first up to the level of their security， 
fol1owed by the (1) costs and expenses relating to the bankruptcy case 
(and public debts or debts of common benefit)， 216 (2) wages of 
employees， social ins町 anceand other relevant debts as provided under 
labor law， (3) tax liabilities， and (4) general unsecured bankruptcy 
c1aims.217 It also retained the rule for pro rata dis住ibutionswhere the 
assets are insufficient to pay al1 of the claims within a single ranking in 
ful1. Supplementing this general priority scheme白血e2002 Dra食
Chinese Bankruptcy Law was Artic1e 10: 
The People's Court shal1 safeguard the lawful rights and 
interests of the employees of the bankrupt enterprises in 
accordance with the law when trying bankruptcy cases. 
The People's Government of the place where the bankrupt 
enterprise is located shall properly arrange the settlement and 
215 See， e.g.，出ePRC 1994 and 1997 Decrees. 
216 2002 Draft Clunese Bankruptcy Law art. 40 (providing伽 tdebts of common benefit are ce由 m
debts generated after由ePeop1e's Co国 taccepts a bankruptcy case， e.g.， a debt generatedぉ aresu1t 
ofthe a伽 inis回 tor'srequest to perforrn a bi1atera1 con回 .ct).
217Id. art. 135. 
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lifetime guarantee of the rights of employees of the bankrupt 
enterpnse. 
The second paragraph of Article 10出edto mediate the conflict between 
the two competing priority schemes in China， by putting the burden of 
providing for the settlement and lifetime guarantee of the rights of 
workers on the local governments. 
The October 2004 Draft Chinese Bankruptcy Law adopted a 
di任erentapproach to workers' rights. On the one hand， Article 8 appears 
to cut back on the protection of workers' rights -although it retains the 
frst paragraph of Article 10 of the 2002 draft， itomits the second 
paragraph that provided that local governments have the responsibility 
to arrange for resettlement and guaranteed benefits. On the other hand， 
there is the new priority scheme in Articles 113 and 127 that substantially 
expands worker protection under the bankruptcy law. These articles 
provide血atwhere there are sufficient funds to pay workers' claims in 
ful (including unpaid wages， unpaid basic society insurance， and other 
payments pursu組 tto administrative regulations and the law)，出e
traditional priority ranking wi1l apply. However， where workers' claims 
cannot be paid in ful， the workers get frst priority over the prior rights of 
secured creditors企omthe assets securing the secured creditors' claims. 
This amendment has taken many people by surprise， especially in 
the light of the proposal accompanying the October 2004 draft that 
provides that over the next few years certain SOEs will be subject to 
“administrative closure" proced町 espursu加 tto regulations to be 
prescribed by the State Council.218 These “adminis回 tiveprocedures" are 
intended to address the special problems faced by SOEs， including 
resettlement and the guarantee of lifetime benefits. When this period 
expires and al SOEs are subject to the new law， there should be few 
SOEs白atwil1 need special trea加lentfor their workers. It is thus even 
les understandable why the October 2004 draft proposes to give workers 
a special priority right that even exceeds in many respects the仕切tme脱
出atworkers get under the government policy decrees. This proposal 
goes beyond the decrees in出reeways: (1) all workers are covered， not 
just employees of SOEs; (2) the claims apply to a broad range of claims 
and not to a specific type of claim (i.e.， resettlement rights); and (3) the 
priority extends to al of the property of the enterprise and not just the 
land use rights. Where the workers cannot get paid in ful， the burden 
will fal on the secured creditors. If these provis 
218 See旬xtaccompanying supra notes 64-66. 
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significant policy shift in the October 2004 dra金infavor of protecting 
workers. It would be unfortunate ifthe People's Courts were to interpret 
Article 8 as broadly supporting a judicial discretion not to accept a 
bankruptcy case where it appeared that there were insufficient assets to 
pay workers in ful under Articles 113 and 127.219 
Vietnam 
The 1993 Vietnamese Bankruptcy Law adopted the same priority 
scheme as in the 1986 Chinese Bankruptcy Law. Pursuant to Section 38， 
secured claims were entitled to be paid first up to the level of the value of 
the sec町 ity. The priority scheme listed in Section 39 of the 1993 law 
provided for pa戸nent企omthe assets of the estate to be as follows: the 
costs and expense of血ebankruptcy proceedings; labor claims (defined as 
covering unpaid wages， termination of employment allowance， social 
insurance as determined by the law and other rights pursuant to a 
collective or individual labor agreement); tax c1aims; and then general 
unsecured creditors. 
The 2002 Draft Vietnamese Bankruptcy Law adopted this same 
scheme. Section 26 preserved the secured creditors' right to be paid in 
ful up to the value of its security and Section 27 set out the same priority 
scheme for the preferred classes of creditors. The 2002 draft also 
included a new Section 28， which provided that claims at the same 
preferential rank should be paid proportionally based on the value of each 
claim. 
Unlike the recent Chinese proposa1s， the 2004 Vie仕lamese
Bankruptcy Law does not give workers any special protection greater 
than the priority under existing law. Article 35 of the 2004 Vietnamese 
Bankruptcy Law retains the priority for secured creditors over other 
creditors up to the value of the secured creditors' collateral and makes it 
clear that the payment will come企omsuch assets. Bankruptcy expenses 
and workers' benefits also retain their order ofpriority pursuant to Article 
37. However， the overall priority scheme in Article 37 deviates企omits 
predecessor provisions by omitting any priority for tax claims. This 
change is in accordance with the modem trend in favor of cutting back on 
the categories of preferential claims in favor of maximizing payments to 
general unsecured claims. 
219 See Campbell， Korff & Eu 1in Chua， China Sets Short Time帥 lefor Bankrup町 LawReform， 
18(8) CHlNA L. & PRAC. 21，21 (Oct. 2004) (raising a more general concern about the exercise of 
judicia1 discretion to pro伽 tworkers' ri俳句underthe 1une 2004 Draft Chinese Bankruptcy Law). 
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VII. CROSS-BORDER INSOL VENCY ISSUES 
Since it is becoming increasingly common for bankruptcies to 
have cross-border elements， modem insolvency systems must address 
both“inbound" and “outbound" cross-border insolvency issues. In the 
Chinese context， an inbound bankruptcy might involve a foreign 
representative (e.g.， a trustee or a liquidator) who comes to China to seek 
recognition of a foreign bankruptcy， with perhaps the intention of gaining 
local cooperation in securing assets in China， and ultimately of obtaining 
permission to take such 脱出(orthe proceeds from the sale ofthe assets) 
back to her foreign home where the primary bankruptcy proceeding is 
being held. An outgoing bankruptcy would involve the opposite scenario 
in which a representative企omChina would go overseas to seek 
recognition and cooperation合oma foreign court. When considering 
these issues， judicial decisions may generally be divided into two 
paradigm approaches: the “territoriality approach" and the “universality 
approach." If adopting the territoriality approach， a Chinese judge would 
refuse to recognize the ex仕aterritorial application of a foreign 
jurisdiction's laws and refuse to allow the foreign representative to c1aim 
the assets of the foreign debtor that are located within the Chinese court' s 
jurisdiction. In contrast， if adopting the universality approach， the 
Chinese judge would recognize the extraterritorial application of the 
foreign jurisdiction's laws and allow the foreign representative to c1aim 
the assets of the foreign debtor that are located within the Chinese court' s 
jurisdiction.220 
China 
At present， none of the national PRC insolvency legislation 
includes provisions血atspecifically apply to the above scenarios.221 
When con企ontedwith incoming cross-border insolvency issues， Chinese 
courts have仕aditionallyadopted the teritorial approach戸2However， the 
situation is changing. Hong Kong liquidators have noted that over the 
last few years they increasingly have been able to secure the cooperation 
of their cross-border counte叩artsin Guangdong. Moreover， inone of the 
series of annual meetings held between Hong Kong and Beijing 
insolvency professionals， the Beijing team noted that recognition of a 
220 For fur仕lerdiscussion of the territorial町 anduniversality approaches， see Charles D. Booth， 
Living in Uncerlain Times: The Need 10 Strengthen Hong Kong Transnational Insolvency Law，" 34 
COLUMBIA J. TRANS'L L. 389 (1996). 
221 For a more detailed discussion ofChinese cross-border inso¥vency ¥aw， see Jingxia Slu， Chinese 
Cross-Border lnsolν'encies: Current lssues and Fu加reDevelopments， 10 INT'L. INSOLVENCY R. 33. 
For a discussion ofthe approach adopted by Shenzhen， see Zhang & Boo白，supra note 3， at24-29. 
<" See， e.g.， Liwan Districl Construction Company v. Euro-America China Property Ltd.， reported 
and commented on by Dona1d 1.Lewis & Char¥es D. Booth， Case Comment， 6 CHJNA L. & PRAC. 
27 (1990). 
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Hong Kong liquidator might be more likely in a voluntary liquidation 
commenced by the company's shareholders or directors th姐 m a 
compulsory winding up戸3
The 2001 Dra食ChineseBankruptcy Law was the first draft that 
included a provision on cross-border insolvency， and al subsequent drafts 
have as wel1. Artic1e 8 of the 2002 draft Chinese bankruptcy law 
explicitly provided that the draft: law applies to a debtor's assets outside 
the PRC， 加dthus adopted a universality approach for outbound 
transactions.224 This provision has been retained in Article 7 of the 
October 2004 Draft Chinese Bankruptcy Law. It is a significant step for 
Chinese legislation to assert that it is extraterritorial in scope and the 
inclusion of such a provision wil1 make it much easier for Chinese 
representatives to seek assets. However， this is the only mention of the 
eXtrate汀itorialityof Chinese bankruptcy law in the dra食. Some thought 
should be given to whether the avoidance powers should also apply 
extrateηitorially， as this is a separate issue企omwhether property 
worldwide is pa口ofthe estate戸5
However， conceming inbound transactions， Article 8 of the 2002 
draft was not as clearly universal. Rather， it provided that when， inthe 
co町田 ofthe foreign bankruptcy procedures， a foreign p訂 tyapplied for 
execution on the debtor's property located in the PRC， the People's Court 
may make a ruling of approval， except in the fol1owing cases: 
a) If there are no relevant treaties or reciprocal relations 
between the coun仕yand the PRC; 
b) Ifthe application violates the public interests ofthe PRC; 
c) If the approval might impair the lawful interests or rights 
of the creditors in the PRC; and 
d) If there are other factors that the People's Court thinks 
ought to be taken into consideration. 
Article 7 ofthe October 2004 draft retains this provision with two 
important amendments: (1) subsection (d) has been deleted (which is a 
change for the better because subsection (d) gave the local judge open-
ended discretion); and (2) in the preamble， may has been changed to shαl. 
This also cuts down on the court's discretion and wil1 facilitate more 
cross-border cooperation. This provision improves upon existing Chinese 
223 Meeting held in Beijing on Apr. 12， 2001. See Zhang & Booth， Beijing's lnitiative on Cross-
Border lnsolν'ency， supra note 47， at36. 
224 In a recent ca~e， a' Hong Kong court held that China' s current insolvency law was universal in 
scope and would be given recognition by仕leHong Kong court. CCIC Finance Ltd. v. Guangdong 
lnt'l Trust & lnv. Corp. and Guangdong lnt'l Trust & lnv. Corp. Hong Kong (Holdings) Ltd而
!-.ig.)， HCA 15651 of 1999 (July 31，2001). 
“， For a discussion of出isissue in the Hong Kong context， see Charles D. Booth & Philip St. J. 
Smart， The New Avoidance Powers under Hong Kong lnsolvency Law: A Move from Terriωria肋
toEx加 terァitoriality，34 INT'L LA w. 255 (2000). 
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bankruptcy law. Significantly， the rhetoric of the section moves away 
丘omthe territoriality approach住aditionallyadopted by the PRC towards 
foreign insolvencies. However， due to the incIusion of subsection (a)， 
ArticIe 7 isunlikely to have much impact for many years because China 
has not entered into any relevant treaties or reciprocal relations on this 
topic. Not even China and Hong Kong have entered into a bilateral 
agreement on cross-border insolvencies.26 This type of provision is 
called a “reclproclザ provision，"227and， unfortunately， such provisions 
hamper cross-border cooperation. 
A further provision that should be included in the legislation is 
one setting forth the documents that a foreign representative should 
produce to the Chinese courts to prove the existence of the foreign 
bankruptcy and gain recognition. This topic has come up frequently in 
the annual meetings of the Hong Kong and B吋泊g insolvency 
professionals. Recognition will be more likely if the legislation is very 
clear as to what documents must be submitted， who must sign them， and 
whether any official stamps are necessary. 
ηetnam 
Vietnam has not signed any cross-border insolvency treaties， and 
the 1993 Vietnamese Bankruptcy Law did not include any inbound or 
outbound cross-border insolvency prOVlSlOns. However， cross-border 
insolvency issues were raised during the dra食ingprocess in the context of 
dealing with a bankrupt enterprise's assets overseas.228 Section 2 of the 
2002 Draft Vietnamese Bankruptcy Law provided that the new law would 
apply to merchants operating in Vietnam and to their members operating 
outside Vietnam. The intention of this section was to adopt the 
universality approach and to assert extra-territorial application of 
Vie凶amesebankruptcy laws over a merchant's property located outside 
Vietnam戸9The Vietnamese were aware that the effect of including such 
226 See Zhang & Boo仇 Beijing's lnitiative on Cross-Border lnsolvency， supra note 47. This is one 
iSl削 hatthe insolvency profesionals from Hong Kong and Beijing are discusing 
221 Interestin畠Iy，the Law Reform Commission of Hong Kong has also sugested that recognition by 
Hong Kong should be based on reciprocity. THE LAW REFORM COMMlSION OF HONG KONG， 
REpORT ON THE WINDING UP PROVISIONS IN THE COMPANIES ORDINANCE 213 (J凶y199). 
AI伽 ughbo白 HongKong and China are proposing a reciprocity requirement，由eyare aproaching 
吐latpOSl位。n仕omdiferent directions -China is moving from a teritoriality aproach， unIike Hong 
Kong， which is cuting back on its more universality-based aproach. For a discusion of Hong 
Kong cros-border insolvency isues， see Booth， supra nole 20. 
228 Se VIETNAMESE BANKRUFTCY LAW RESEARCH REPORT，supra note 4，at PEt One，I，5.4 
(“Dealing with the bankrupt enterprise's residual asets overseas") (seting out the intemational 
叩proaches10 the topic， but not discusing the Vietnamese position). 
229-1 learned出isfirst-hand during the workshops 1 conducted in Hanoi， Vi拍larD， in June 202. See 
supra note 14. 
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a position would depend on whether foreign countries decided to 
recognize the new Vietnamese bankruptcy law.23o 
Unfortunately， this assertion of the extra-territorial application of 
Vietnamese bankruptcy law in the 2002 draft was not included in the 
2004 Vietnamese Bankruptcy Law. Article 4 of the 2004 law provides 
that the bankruptcy law shall apply to al enterprises and cooperatives that 
operate in Vietnam， except as otherwise provided in intemational 
conventions signed by Vietnam. There is no language in the Article 
extending the law's application to the assets of enterprises or cooperatives 
located overseas. Thus， the result is that the new law， like the 1993 law， 
is silent on both inbound and outbound cross-border insolvency issues. It 
is disappointing that Vietnam did not address these issues in the new law. 
Article 4 of the 2004 Vietnamese Bankruptcy Law is also a 
successor provision to another line of provisions in Vietnamese 
bankruptcy law regarding the applicability of Vietnamese bankruptcy law 
over businesses involving foreign individuals and organizations (FIEs). 
Section 51 of the 1993 Vietnamese Bankruptcy Law provided that the 
bankruptcy law applied to a bankruptcy proceeding against businesses 
that involved foreign individuals and organizations except where an 
intemational treaty entered into by Vietnam provided otherwise. Article 
2 of the Vietnamese Decree No. 189 further provided that the settlement 
of the bankruptcy of a business with partial or entire foreign inves加 ent
shall comply with the 1993 Vietnamese Bankruptcy Law， the Vie紅lamese
FIL， Vietnamese Decree No. 189， and other legal documents that provide 
detailed guidance on the settlement of bankruptcy in conformity with the 
specitic nature of these businesses except as otherwise provided for in 
intemational treaties. 231 Article 4 has superseded these provisions: 
“businesses with foreign individuals and organizations" under the 1993 
law are included within “ente中市es"under the 2004 draft. 
'This matter has also been of concem to foreign companies with 
interests in Vie阻ameseFIEs. Where such foreign companies have run 
into tinancial problems， they have avoided resorting to the Vietnamese 
legal system by handling the matter “by way of a change in ownership of 
the investor offshore or else an agreement by the offshore liquidator to 
sel the equity interest in the Vie位lameselicensed venture."Z32 In this 
fas 
230 See VIETNAMESE BANKRUPTCY LAW RESEARCH REpORT， supra note 4， atPart One， I， 5.4 
C"Dealing wi出世間bar歯 uptenterprise's residual asets overseas"). 
231 International treaties bave been incorporated into Section 9 ofthe 2002 Draft Vietnamese Bankruptcy 
Law， which a1so incorporated Section 51 of the 193 law. 
232 Vietnam (Chapter 39)ョinINSOL， CROSS-BoRDER INSOLVENCY: A GUIDE TO RECOGNITION 
AND ENFORCEMENT 231 (203). 
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VIII. CONCLUSION 
Dra食inga bankruptcy law is never an easy task. The process is 
even more difficult for socialist coun位ieswith economies in transition 
that hope to use the law as an e首ectivetool of market甘ansformation.
The task is further complicated by the conflicting govemment policies for 
giving special protection to the workers of SOEs that were established 
during the planned-economy period. Such has been the situation in both 
China and Vietnam as they have been reforming their bankruptcy laws. 
China's proposed law and Vie佃am'srecently enacted law 
improve upon both coun出ぜ legislation. 1n China's case， itwi1l also 
unifシtheexisting bankruptcy law framework. These new laws are more 
detai1ed and comprehensive than their predecessors were， although during 
the law reform process some of the early aspirations (e.g.， for expanding 
the scope of application) have given way to pragmatic conservatism， at
times pulling back企ommore expansive coverage in the 2002 drafts. In 
the case of China， several important issues are sti1l being debated. 
China made significant innovations to its ban畑中tcy
administration and co中oraterescue procedures. The introduction of a 
professional administrator with the requisite experience and釘ammg
should dramatically improve the efficiency of bankruptcies and 
reorganizations in China. The further introduction of a creditors' 
committee creates a mechanism to increase creditor involvement and 
provides a counterbalance to the adminis仕ator.
Vieむlamadopted a more gradualist approach in which it tinkered 
with the basic adrninistrative structure. The佐usteecommittee has 
replaced the asset management and asset liquidation teams and the 
committee composition has changed， but the system retains much of the 
approach of the 1993 law. The major change to the co中oraterescue 
process is the abolition of the requirement (in old Section 2 of the 1993 
law) that before being eligible for bankruptcy relief， the ente中risemust 
already have exbausted “al financial measures." Its deletion will improve 
the co甲oratereorganization process， but the new Vietnamese procedure 
sti1l1acks the checks and balances ofthe Chinese approach and there is no 
“driver" of the process. Perhaps the “manager" post created in Vietnam 
wi1l appeal to creditors， and they may be able to use it to transform the 
procedure. 
It is one thing to say that the new laws are much better (they are)， 
but quite another to predict that the number 
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increase in the number of cases commenced. 233 This should not be 
surprising. Enacting a new bankruptcy/corporate rescue law is only the 
first step. For these laws to attract filings by debtors and creditors 
requires the existence and integration of many other factors. Thousands 
of professionals need to be trained in the workings of the new procedures 
-lawyers and accountants， of co町 se，but also investment and banking 
advisors， valuation experts， and others. The judiciary must also be 
廿ained;judges handling bankruptcy cases need to be well versed not only 
in bankruptcy law， but also in company law， accounting， and real estate 
matters. In addition， the bankruptcy law will not function properly unless 
there are effective secured transaction迫， real prope此y，and co中orate
govemance legislation in place. Lastly， a co中oraterescue culture must 
develop. The participants in the process must be willing to work together 
and to compromise， with a view to agreeing on the terms of a rescue 
proposal. Putting al of these factors in place can take years， if not 
decades. 1n China and Vietnam， this process can now begin. 
233 See Report on RETA 5795: Insolvency Law Reforms in the Asian and Pacific Region， 1 L. & 
POLICY AT THE ASIAN DEVELOPMENT BANK 10(2000). 
